19 September 2002
Armitage Points to Dramatic Bilateral Intelligence Improvements
(Says openness of exchanges with other nations must be preserved)
(1830)
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told members of Congress
September 19 that there have been dramatic improvements in bilateral
intelligence collection and sharing since last September's terrorist
attacks on the United States.
In testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee, the deputy
secretary said: "Probably the most dramatic improvement in our
intelligence collection and sharing has come in bilateral cooperation
with other nations -- those we considered friendly before 9/11, and
some we considered less friendly."
He described this as a marked changed and one that he said he believes
comes "not just from collective revulsion at the nature of the
attacks, but also the common recognition that such groups present a
risk to any nation with an investment in the rule of law."
As the State Department confronts the challenge of having to comb
through hundreds of thousands of visa applications looking for a small
number of terrorists, it must do so "in a way that doesn't estrange us
from the rest of the world," Armitage said. "One of the great
competitive advantages this nation has always had is the robust
exchange of people and brain power from other nations. We simply
cannot afford to loose that openness," he added.
As the United States enters the second year of the war on terrorism,
the deputy secretary said collecting, evaluating and acting on
tactical intelligence about terrorists will continue to be a difficult
task. Putting it in context he said: "We have to be right, all the
time, in order to prevent an attack. And the terrorists only need to
be right once."
Following is the text of Armitage's remarks:
(begin transcript)
Testimony for Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
Hearing Before the Joint Intelligence Committee
19 September 2002
This year on September 11th, I had the opportunity to hold a
commemoration ceremony for State Department employees --a small
remembrance for our Department and our posts overseas. It was a
difficult day for us all, as Americans and just as human beings. But
it was also a difficult day for us as government employees. First, we
all heard the explosion at the Pentagon and we knew those people -
they were our colleagues and our friends.
But we all felt this personally in another way, as well. Every person
who works at the Department of State is in the service because we
believe that this nation, our people and our ideals are worth
protecting and are worth promulgating in the world. Just as our men
and women in uniform risk their lives every day, the employees at the
Department of State put their lives on the line - and we do it to
prevent such tragedies from happening.
Every day, we hear the echo of September 11th and we feel the impact
of the more than 3,000 killed, but we also think of the sacrifice of
members of our Department of State family who have died for this
nation. We think of Foreign Service Officer Barbara Green and her
teenaged daughter, Kristin, who were killed in terrorist attacks in
Islamabad in March. We think of our employees -- American, Kenyan and
Tanzanian -who perished in the al-Qaeda attacks on our embassies in
1998. Far too many of our officers have died at the hands of
terrorists in the last three decades.
So, if you ask the question, are we satisfied that we did all we could
have to prevent the attacks on 9-11 from happening? The answer is, of
course, no. Because they did happen. We are in business to promote
this nation, but also to protect it and all its citizens, at home and
abroad. Obviously, we did not succeed on September 11th. I for one
welcome this Committee's efforts to examine why we failed and to help
us put into place the measures to prevent this kind of failure from
happening again. We all, all of us who serve in my Department and in
public service, are motivated by the desire to do all that is humanly
possible to prevent such an attack from ever recurring.
Having said that, can I tell you that the reason this happened to us
is that people were doing a bad job? Can I tell you that we will
punish those who failed, fix it, and know that this will never happen
again? I cannot tell you that; to do so would be dishonest, at best.
As [Staff director for the Joint Inquiry investigating the 9-11
attacks) Eleanor Hill told you yesterday, there is no question that we
could have done better; and I believe we are doing better. And there
are more improvements we could and should and will be making. Again,
we appreciate the assistance our partners in Congress and on the staff
of this Committee are offering us in that regard. But I simply cannot
guarantee that we could prevent this from ever happening again; no one
can. No one should. Let me explain why.
Before September 11th, our intelligence on the threat from al-Qaeda
was excellent -- at a strategic level. In the summer of 2001, we made
several key policy changes at the Department of State. In brief, we
demarched the Taliban and demanded unequivocally and authoritatively
that they cease support for terrorism; we told them we would hold them
responsible for attacks perpetrated by Afghanistan-based terrorists.
We resumed material assistance to the forces of the Northern Alliance.
And we fundamentally shifted the focus of our policy in South Asia to
counter-terrorism. These actions were not taken in a vacuum: they were
based on the intelligence reporting we were getting at the time.
Basically, we knew that bin Laden had the means and the intent to
attack Americans -- both at home and abroad. We knew that the Taliban
was not only sheltering but effectively aiding and abetting him. And
we knew that we needed to act to change this equation, and to act
immediately. We knew the urgency of the threat. Our strategic
intelligence continues to be excellent.
What we did not know was at a tactical level. We did not know exactly
what target al-Qaeda intended to attack and how and when. The
Department of State analysis in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks, the so-called "culpability cable," found that the
intelligence community had linked two of the hijackers to al-Qaeda,
had transmitted that information to the Department of State's system
for alerting consular officers on the 23rd of August, 2001. The next
day, every consular office in the world had the information via our
TIPOFF system that these individuals were a concern, but by that time,
they had already received visas and were in the United States. If we
had had the information sooner, it is reasonable to believe these two
criminals would never have entered the country in the first place. If
we had had these two pieces to the jigsaw puzzle in advance, could we
have seen the whole picture and prevented the attacks? Perhaps. But I
don't believe that is a question we will be able to answer with any
certainty.
We have, however, taken steps to improve information sharing within
the intelligence community, including our diplomatic reporting from
overseas. We had some track record of improvement in information
sharing with the FBI and law enforcement following the attacks on our
embassies in 1998; we have put in place measures to improve that
cooperation. But our level of interaction -- including with local law
enforcement - is still not where it needs to be. The channels for
sharing information are not well established. That is a function of
the past legal framework, changed by the Patriot Act, a function of
the historical record on such cooperation, and a function of culture.
This will take time and effort to change. Our coordination with the
CIA was good before 9-11, but it is better now. In addition to
increasing the numbers of meetings and formal liaison positions
between our staff and leadership, we are also trading a much higher
volume of information. CIA contributions to our TIPOFF database, for
example, have increased by 450 percent since 9-11. Again, we still
need to improve the process for sharing and to increase the amounts of
information shared, but the channels do exist and are being used.
Probably the most dramatic improvement in our intelligence collection
and sharing has come in bilateral cooperation with other nations --
those we considered friendly before 9-11, and some we considered less
friendly. This is a marked change, and one that I believe results not
just from collective revulsion at the nature of the attacks, but also
the common recognition that such groups present a risk to any nation
with an investment in the rule of law.
Streamlining information-sharing and improving tactical intelligence
-- the actual penetration of terrorist cells -- will continue to be
challenges for the U.S. government and for other nations, as well. A
particular challenge for the Department of State will continue to be
to how to comb through hundreds of thousands of visa applications
looking for a small number of terrorists in a way that doesn't
estrange us from the rest of the world. One of the great competitive
advantages this nation has always had is the robust exchange of people
and brainpower from other nations. We simply cannot afford to lose
that openness.
The Department of State has long focused its energy on improving our
visa process to protect national security while continuing to
capitalize on our ability to attract visitors, foreign workers, and
new immigrants. In little more than a decade, we have gone from
keeping adverse information about potential visa applicants on index
cards, to diskettes, to real-time information available on the desktop
computer of every consular officer in the world. But we still lack the
capacity to quickly distinguish the dangerous applicants from the
desirable, and we must fix this. We must fix this by enhancing the
quality of the underlying information from the intelligence community
and our consular officers, but also by continuing to streamline our
coordination.
I believe that we do have important successes, although it will always
be difficult to give you metrics. Unfortunately, when it comes to the
threat of terrorism, we are in the position of measuring our success
by what has not happened. Consider, for example, that on this
September 11th, we closed several of our missions around the world,
including in Djakarta, based on credible information about planned
attacks. Did we actually prevent an attack on that day? We have no way
of knowing for certain. But our quick analysis and action in that case
may well have saved lives. Unfortunately, collecting, evaluating and
acting on tactical intelligence about terrorists will continue to be
difficult. After all, we have to be vigilant and cautious at all
times, and evaluate well every single one of the thousands of threat
warnings we get every week. We have to be right, all the time, in
order to prevent an attack. And the terrorists only need to be right
once.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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