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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
FY97 Annual Report

AN/APR-39A(V)2 RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (RWR)

	Navy ACAT III Program 989 systems Total program cost (TY$) $223M Average unit cost (TY$) $168K Full-rate production 1QFY96 Prime Contractor Litton Applied Technology Division

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The AN/APR-39A(v)2 contributes to full-dimensional protection by improving individual aircraft probability of survival through improved aircrew situational awareness of the electromagnetic threat environment. The AN/APR-39A(v)2 is a multi-service (Navy/USMC, Army and Special Operations Force) next generation RWR upgrade to the existing AN/APR-39A. The system is intended for helicopters and other non-high performance aircraft. It is capable of detecting and providing alerts to the aircrew of SAM and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) associated pulse, pulse Doppler, and continuous wave (CW) radar activities, identified from a software programmable threat library. In addition to the cockpit video display, the APR-39A(v)2 provides the aircrew with synthetic speech audio threat warnings facilitating a "hands on/heads up" aircrew posture. The system also operates as the electronic warfare controller which can integrate and display data from an onboard missile warning system, laser warning system, and expendable countermeasures dispenser. The system retained the former AN/APR-39A low band vertically polarized blade antenna. The new, more sensitive, circularly polarized spiral antennae are a form and fit replacement for the previous equipment, as is the new night vision compatible cockpit video display and the cockpit control unit.

Early Navy operational testing (OT-IIA) in the AH-1W helicopter, from 1QFY91 through 2QFY92, found the system not operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable. Fleet introduction was not recommended until a subsequent OPEVAL could demonstrate satisfactory resolution of OT-IIA deficiencies.

OT-IIB in a USMC UH-1N helicopter, in accordance with a DOT&E-approved TEMP and test plan, was completed by COMOPTEVFOR in May 1995, with a finding of operationally effective and suitable and with a recommendation for fleet introduction in the UH-1N. Involvement by the OT community in the DT leading to this phase of OT facilitated meaningful use of DT test results and allowed some streamlining of the OT-IIB. DOT&E, military staff, and support analysts observed major portions of OT-IIB testing and data collection.

The AN/APR-39A(v)2 RWR is not a major defense acquisition program and no BLRIP report was produced. The system is covered by language in The National Defense Authorization Act for FY89 Conference Report (H.R. 4481, page 345), which "directed that all future operational test results for RWR update programs be reviewed and approved by the Director of Operational Test & Evaluation, prior to obligation of production funds".

The Navy Milestone III was approved in 1QFY96. An inventory objective of 989 systems is intended as the standard RWR for the UH-1N, AH-1, V-22, VH-60, HH-60, SH-60, CH-53, MH-53, KC-130, and the VH-3 aircraft.

There was no OT&E activity during FY97. The first production deliveries are expected in January 1999 with the first follow-on integration probably in the HH-60.

DOT&E reported the IOT&E results in his FY95 Annual Report, and also in an October 1995 Memorandum report to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy/Research Development and Acquisition, to support the milestone decision authority full rate production decision.

DOT&E found the OT&E of the AN/APR-39A(v)2 adequate and found the system to be operationally effective and suitable as installed in the UH-1N helicopter.

DOT&E recommended that FOT&E be conducted to validate system threat identification and detection range performance, in an operational environment, against the three threats for which sample size was limited during OPEVAL. FOT&E was also recommended to validate maintainability (specifically BIT) under operational conditions, since this part of the OPEVAL was limited by the high reliability of the system during the relatively short IOT&E. FOT&E is also required to validate performance when integrated in aircraft besides the UH-1N. FOT&E in the HH-60 is being planned for the FY99-FY01 time frame.