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APPENDIX C

IPB IN SUPPORT OF AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Conducting a well-planned IPB is fundamental to the execution of the ADA mission. It is essential that the Patriot battalion and battery commanders be able to understand enemy air and ground operations and how the terrain will affect enemy operations. By evaluating this information, various possible enemy COAs can be developed and war-gamed. This will provide commanders, at all levels, a better picture of the battlefield and enable them to plan and place assets to obtain maximum firepower in the right place at the right time.

IPB in support of AD operations is a quantified, step-by-step process that examines enemy air and ground activity, and identifies gaps in intelligence holdings. This recess will allow the commander and his staff to direct his collection assets to enable them to visualize the battlefield and understand the enemy's intentions. Preparation and continuous updates of aerial IPB are fundamental to the execution of the AD mission on the modern battlefield.

THE IPB PROCESS

The breakup of the former Soviet Union has caused the Army to shift its focus from Soviet doctrine to other regional threats. With the current lack of doctrine to plan against, the IPB process will provide continuous input toward building that doctrine.

FM 34-130 is the manual that explains the IPB process. This appendix will describe the process as it applies to Patriot operations. IPB allows the commander and the intelligence staff to predict where and when the enemy will strike, and what assets he will use. The modem battlefield is viewed in three dimensions: width, depth, and airspace. This airspace, or aerial dimension, is the most dynamic and fast paced of the three dimensions. The Patriot battalion and battery commanders must consider all the aspects of air operations and must be aware of the capabilities of all air threats, to include ballistic and aerodynamic (cruise) missiles; multimission UAVs; and RW and FW aircraft. The S2 should rely heavily on input from the air defense and aviation officers while integrating air aspects into the IPB process.

The IPB process has four steps:

• Define the battlefield environment.
• Describe the battlefield effects.
• Evaluate the threat.
• Determine threat COAs.

As air IPB is conducted from a different perspective than that of ground IPB, the terrain and weather have correspondingly different effects on air operations. The primary air threats that Patriot commanders must carefully evaluate are: TBMs, CMs, and FW aircraft. Secondary consideration must be given to UAVs and RW aircraft.

DEFINE THE AIR BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

The air battlefield, like the ground, includes an AO, battle space, and an area of interest (AI).

The air AO is the area where the commander is assigned responsibility and authority for military operations. It is identical to the ground in width and depth, and extends vertically up to the maximum altitude of threat aircraft and missile systems.

Battle space is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to find and engage the enemy. It includes the breadth, depth, and height in which the commander positions and moves assets over time. Battle space is not assigned by a higher commander and can extend beyond the commander's AO.

The AI is the geographic area from which information and intelligence are required to facilitate planning or successful conduct of the command's operation. Because the commander and staff need time to process information and to plan and synchronize operations, the commander's AI is generally larger than the AO or battle space. Due to the great distances that aircraft and missiles can rapidly cover, the air AI will extend vertically and horizontally to cover the maximum service ceilings and ranges of threat air systems. These include missile and delivery systems, plus known or suspected threat airfields, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), and missile sites.

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
(TERRAIN/WEATHER ANALYSIS)

The nature of airspace does not eliminate the need for terrain analysis. Air IPB focuses on the impact of geographic factors on the ability of threat air to approach, find, and engage a target. Analysis of the terrain for air IPB follows the same principles as ground analysis, and uses the military aspects of terrain.

OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE

This relates to the influence of terrain on reconnaissance and target acquisition. In the IPB context, observation relates to optical and electronic line-of-sight (LOS). Many air and battlefield operating systems require LOS to effectively find and engage targets. These systems include radios, radars, jammers, direct-fire weapons, and airborne-ground observers. Fields of fire relate to the terrain effects on weapon systems. Battlefield airspace must be analyzed with regard to routes which provide the best protection for air threats entering the target area, and those which provide the best fields of fire once they reach the target area.

COVER AND CONCEALMENT (MASKING)

Cover and concealment have slightly different applications with respect to air systems. There are several tactics and techniques which fall into the context of cover and concealment and are defined as follows:

• Contour flying--to maintain a constant low altitude from the ground with regard to the terrain.
• Pop-up tactics--using natural terrain or man-made features to conceal the attacker until the last possible moment before engaging a target.
• Masking--using terrain to protect an air system from visual and or electronic observation or detection.
• Cover--using terrain to provide protection from direct fire weapon systems.
• Ground clutter--can be characterized as a reduction of signal to noise ratio due to the signature of a background and is different for each type of terrain and feature. Threat air systems will use contour flying, masking, and ground clutter to avoid detection and to provide cover from direct fires. Air systems will also use the terrain by loitering on reverse slopes, using pop-up tactics, and by using ground clutter and vegetation as a backdrop to enhance concealment.

OBSTACLES

Obstacles are broken down into three primary types:

• Those which prevent the effective employment of AD systems.
• Those which restrict contour flights (below 22.8 meters).
• Those which force air threats to employ a particular attack profile or route, or to gain excessive altitude.

Of particular interest are obstacles and terrain which restrict lateral movement within an AA and movement corridor; canalizing movement or restricting evasive action. Additionally, terrain may stop the employment of certain air threat systems in that it exceeds the system's maximum operating ceiling.

KEY TERRAIN

Key terrain is any locality or area in which the control will afford a marked tactical advantage to either combatant. In air analysis, this consists of terrain features which canalize or constrain air threat systems, plus terrain with an elevation higher than the maximum ceiling of air threat systems. Additionally, areas that can be used for airfields, LZ/DZs, or FARPs need to be considered as key terrain, since these areas could be used to support friendly or threat air operations that may be targeted against the Patriot site or the defended asset.

AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH

Air avenues of approach (AAOAs) are evaluated using some of the same criteria as for ground. A good AAOA into its target area will permit maneuver while providing terrain masking from surface-to-air weapon systems. A twisted arrow will be used to denote AAOAs. Red arrows will represent threat avenues and blue will represent friendly avenues. Ensure that each AAOA is numbered.

Some common AAOAs are--

• A road running down a valley.
• A direct line from the enemy operating base.
• A river bed.

Factors which should be used to determine AAOAs are--

• Type of air threat.
• Air threat point of origin.
• Potential to support maneuver.
• Freedom to maneuver within the air avenue.
• Protection afforded to the air threat system.
• Air threat and pilot capabilities.

TYPES OF AIR THREATS

The different types of air threats and their flying characteristics are as follows:

• Some CMs are terrain-following. TBMs are not terrain-dependent.
• FW aircraft usually follow major terrain and man-made features (rivers and roads). Depending on doctrine, they may fly a straight line.
• UAVs, small and elusive, usually fly low. The altitude can vary.
• RW aircraft primarily conduct contour flights. They follow ridge lines and military crests.

AIR THREAT POINT OF ORIGIN

Always begin at the threat operating base (airstrip and launch sites) and work toward what you believe is the enemy objective. This allows a look at the big picture. When determining air avenues, do not stop at the edge of the commander's battle space. An air avenue may look good on the map, but there could be a mountain or an urban area which could discourage the use of that avenue.

Air avenues support maneuver and are used to achieve ground objectives or to support theater and national objectives. Air avenues also provide freedom to maneuver while using air assets. Does the avenue--

• Canalize the air system?
• Provide observation and fields of fire?
• Provide LOS?
• Have access to adjacent avenues?
• Provide the ability to find a target and use available munitions (a good ordnance release line)?

Air avenues provide protection for the air system and pilot. Does the avenue provide--

• Terrain masking (cover and concealment)?
• For the full use of air speed?
• Protection against radar detection?
• Protection from AD weapon systems and tactical air support?
• For limited exposure to surface weapons?

Do the air system and pilot have the capabilities to perform contour flying at night, in all weather conditions and ranges?

WEATHER ANALYSIS

Air operations are especially susceptible to the effects of weather. Weather analysis for air operations considers the same factors as ground operations. Theses factors are--

• Visibility. Visibility has a significant impact on air operations, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
• High winds. High winds will hinder maneuver, CAS, and target engagement, especially in tight mobility corridors.
• Precipitation. Precipitation affects air system performance and reduces the effectiveness of radars.
• Cloud cover and ceilings. Clouds may restrict operations by setting low operational ceilings and restricting visibility and target engagement.
• Extreme temperatures and humidity. Temperature has a severe effect on air systems by decreasing combat range and altitude (particularly RW aircraft).

EVALUATE THE AIR THREAT

Threat evaluation for air IPB consists of a detailed study of enemy air capabilities, organization, and doctrine. The following steps should be used when evaluating the threat:

• Collect and analyze doctrinal threat data.
• Analyze threat air capabilities.
• Conduct target evaluation.
• Update and analyze threat operations.

THREAT DATA

Collecting and analyzing doctrinal threat data should determine the following:

• The major strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of the enemy's air operations.
• Which objectives may be targeted for destruction or suppression.
• Where friendly AD assets fit into the enemy's objectives. Do they need to be destroyed or suppressed for the enemy plan to work?
• The enemy's air order of battle. How are his assets organized? Knowledge of threat organization, and who has operational control, will indicate the importance of the AO. For example, if the enemy's SU-24s are at theater level and you are seeing SU-24s in your area, then you are probably receiving the theater's main attack.
• How does the enemy doctrinally attack? Will the enemy use airborne-air assault forces with an air or ground attack? Will they synchronize the air attack? Do they have the capability to coordinate an air strike (possibly with varied air threat platforms that can overmatch friendly AD capability)?
• Air system entry (ingress) and exit (egress) speeds.
• What is the size of the threat's TBM brigade, battalion, or battery, and what is their operational doctrine for employment?
• How will UAVs be used (for example BDA, RISTA, or attack)? What are the associated profiles?
• Launch points for TBM and UAVs. What are the likely targets? What is the range and endurance of these systems?
• Doctrinal distances for forward arming and refueling points. If the enemy's maximum range falls short of your AO, template where the enemy is likely to stop and refuel.
• CAS. What is the enemy's capability to coordinate air-to-ground attacks?
• BAI. How and where will the enemy attack ground targets?
• SEAD. What is the enemy's capability to coordinate air and artillery operations?
• Flight profile. At what altitude will the enemy approach the target, deliver munitions, and exit the target area?
• Release authority of certain types of ordnance. This is particularly important when dealing with NBC threats.

THREAT AIR CAPABILITIES

Analyzing threat air capabilities should determine the capabilities of the threat systems in terms of--

• Ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
• Performance (speed, altitude, airfield restrictions, and troop-weapon load capacity).
• Endurance and range of UAVs: ingress and egress altitudes and speeds.
• Levels of combat readiness.
• Ability of RW aircraft to conduct pop-up maneuvers and determine the standoff range for firing ATGMs and rockets.
• Target acquisition (visual, radar, and laser guided), night capability, acquisition and identification ranges.
• Standoff ranges for aerodynamic (cruise and tactical air-to-surface) missiles.
• Ordnance load (maximum weight, type, and load mixture).
• Personnel load.
• Navigational capability (type of radar; can it fly at night or in adverse conditions?).
• Combat radius (with or without external tanks, ordnance, location of staging bases).
• Loiter time (how long will it have on station over the target area?).

The Countermeasures Environment

These include standoff jammers, ground-based jammers, or reconnaissance/chaff-laying UAVs or aircraft. Will these degrade friendly AD systems? Does the enemy have antiradiation missiles?

Pilot Training

Can pilots fly at night or perform contour flying? During peacetime did pilots conduct the type of mission they are expected to conduct during war? What are the types and capabilities of threat ordnance? Each type of ordnance should be evaluated for the following:

• Range--assume engagement at maximum range and two-thirds maximum range. What is the accuracy?
• Release altitude--how high or low must the aircraft fly?
• Number of missiles available--what is the reload-refire time?
• Warhead type--for example, NBC, HE, submunitions, et cetera. What are release altitudes?
• Guidance modes--how does the pilot find and engage? (For example, wireguided, TV, fire-and-forget, or laser beam rider.)

TARGET VALUE EVALUATION

Target value evaluation should determine what targets are to be labeled as high-value targets (HVTs). HVTs are assets the enemy or friendly commander has deemed as important for the successful accomplishment of his mission. HVTs are determined by operational necessity and weapon system capability.

UPDATE AND ANALYZE THREAT OPERATIONS

It is important to continuously update air threat operational data (for example, known launch sites, targets, and launching and firing times) to present a clear picture of the current threat situation. Current threat operational data will need to be analyzed against historical data so a pattern of locations for operating bases or launch areas can be determined. Analyzing missile impact area and firing times will give indicators of threat force operations and objectives. Once threat locations, operations, and objectives are understood, steps can be taken to defeat the enemy by readjusting target planning or relocating Patriot assets.

DETERMINE AIR THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

Determining air threat COAs, as with ground, relates the enemy's air, counterair, air defense, and airborne and air assault doctrines with the effects of weather and terrain to determine how the enemy will employ their assets. This is accomplished through the development of the situation, event, and decision support templates. The process of developing these templates is covered in FM 34-130.

SITUATION TEMPLATE

The situation template integrates air attack profiles with terrain, focusing on specific air avenues of approach or mobility corridors. This is done to determine which avenues are the most capable of supporting specific attack techniques, profiles, or the most direct routes to DZ and LZs to ensure survivability.

EVENT TEMPLATE

The event template depicts points (NAIs) where you expect to see certain activities of tactical significance and is used to confirm or deny an enemy COA. In air IPB, these NAIs are based on the terrain constraints on air approach routes to potential targets and analysis of the enemy's attack profiles. Examples of NAIs include DZ and LZs, FARPs, forward staging areas, and aerial choke points.

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

The decision support template (DST) is based on the situation and event templates. The DST does not dictate decisions to the commander, but rather identifies when and where decisions may be required. It is a graphic picture of the intelligence estimate combined with the operation plan and should depict--

• AAOAs.
• DZ and LZs.
• Ranges of enemy systems.
• Ranges of friendly AD systems.
• Target areas of interest (TAIs).
• Decision points (DPs).

Air TAIs and DPs are determined in the same manner as ground operation. However, due to the high speeds of air systems, DPs must be placed significantly farther in advance of the TAIs.