Background
During the Cold War the nuclear weapons complex consisted of ten production sites, the Nevada Test Site, and three research and development laboratories: Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia. This complex developed, tested, and ultimately produced a stockpile of 30,000 weapons deployed on many different types of military delivery systems. The laboratories' role was to design, develop, and test nuclear weapon designs to meet military requirements and to be manufactured at the production sites. In addition, the laboratories maintained surveillance over weapons in the stockpile from production through dismantlement, assessed any safety or performance issues that arose, and recommended appropriate remedial measures. Most of the investment in the complex was in facilities and programs for the manufacture of weapons and for the production of the special nuclear materials and tritium needed in weapons.
During the last five years, which marked the beginning of the post-Cold War period, this set of activities has undergone dramatic changes. Under the START I and START II agreements the United States will reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile by nearly 80% by early in the next century. Most of the production sites in the complex will no longer be needed, the enduring stockpile will be reduced to eight or nine weapon types, and it will be necessary to develop the technical capability to provide confidence in the stockpile without nuclear testing. And, with rare exceptions, the people who will manage the stockpile in the next century will do so without the benefit of having designed or tested a nuclear weapon for the stockpile.
Driven largely by financial pressures--the budget for the weapons program has been cut to less than half of that at the end of the Cold War--the system downsized rapidly and without clear long-term direction. That changed completely over the past 18 months through integrated efforts in the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan that will take us well into the next century. In addition, the level of the Department's efforts directed at stemming nuclear proliferation increased, and important new initiatives such as the counterproliferation program in Department of Defense (DoD) were begun.
As a starting point for post-Cold War planning, the DoD's recent Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the importance of nuclear weapons for the security of the United States and set the requirements for the DOE. In addition, Congress and the Administration provided an overlying set of fiscal realities that put strong constraints on the way in which DOE could do its job. Our principal mission responsibilities in this new world are:
- To ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. During the Cold War, modernization programs limited stockpile aging, and nuclear testing assured weapon performance. Now, no new nuclear weapons are being designed or produced, and nuclear testing is not an option for validating the performance of aging weapons. The President has directed us to find new ways to retain confidence in the nuclear deterrent.
- To provide expertise and technology to support arms control policy development, arms control verification, and intelligence assessments of nuclear weapons activities worldwide. During the Cold War, the emphasis was on policy support and verification of bilateral arms control. Now, the danger of nuclear proliferation is of growing importance. The laboratories are being called upon to support burgeoning efforts on transparency and confidence-building measures, nuclear materials monitoring and control, and detection of and measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Both of these national security mission responsibilities are technically demanding and require husbandry of the scientific and engineering excellence at the laboratories that the nation has relied on throughout the nuclear age. I will discuss each of these two mission responsibilities in turn, with a focus on the new elements that appear in the plan for FY 1996 and a description of Livermore's role. I will close with a short summary, emphasizing those aspects of the program that are particularly vital to the health of and morale at the Laboratory.
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