STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PROLIFERATION: CHINESE CASE STUDIES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
APRIL 10, 1997
Mr. Chairman, Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify
before the Subcommittee on the Administration's efforts to engage China
on the question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
related technologies, missile delivery systems, and advanced
conventional weapons.
In the 21st Century, the stability and economic well-being of the
Asia-Pacific region, and indeed of the world at large, will depend
significantly on the kind of relationship that China and the United
States manage to build The Clinton Administration has therefore given a
high priority to engaging the Chinese Government in an effort to build
a relationship that is constructive, stable, and mutually beneficial
and is based on a shared respect for international norms. One of the
norms that is critical to the United States--and a central focus of our
engagement with China--is nonproliferation.
We need to engage China on nonproliferation both because of that
issue's fundamental importance to U.S. national security and because of
China's increasingly indispensable role in international efforts to
curb proliferation. China's standing as a Permanent Member of the
United Nations Security Council, a nuclear weapons state, an
influential player on the world stage, and a producer of a wide range
of arms and sensitive technologies means that its willingness to play a
positive role may often make the crucial difference between success and
failure--whether in negotiating international arms control and
nonproliferation agreements, dealing with difficult regional
proliferation challenges, or constraining the transfer of potentially
destabilizing goods and technologies.
That is why we regard nonproliferation as one of a handful of core
issues in the U.S.-China bilateral agenda. It has been a key item in
every meeting between Presidents Clinton and Jiang Zemin, most recently
in Manila last November. It was discussed during Vice President Gore's
meetings with Chinese leaders last month. And it figured prominently in
Secretary Albright's February visit to Beijing, and will again when she
meets with Vice Premier Qian Qichen in Washington later this spring.
We engage with the Chinese on nonproliferation frequently and at
various levels. The Chinese have agreed to a regular dialogue at the
vice-ministerial level to discuss nonproliferation and a broad range of
other security matters. The first such ``global security dialogue'' was
held last November between Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis and Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Zhaoxing. Periodic meetings on arms
control have been held between Vice Minister Li and ACDA Director John
Holum. At the experts level, U.S. interagency teams have met as often
as three or four times a year with their Chinese counterparts for
detailed discussions on such subjects as nonproliferation, export
controls, and peaceful nuclear cooperation.
At every level, including at the very top, we stress the importance
we place on nonproliferation and urge that China accept and abide by
international nonproliferation agreements and norms. Where we disagree,
we express our concerns frankly. We make clear that it is not just the
Executive Branch but the Congress, too, that has such concerns. We
point out that failure to resolve problems that have arisen, especially
with respect to Chinese exports, will inevitably impede the improvement
of bilateral relations that both sides seek--and could also have
negative consequences under U.S. nonproliferation sanctions laws.
I do not wish to imply, however, that the U.S.-China
nonproliferation agenda is monopolized by disagreements. Indeed, both
countries recognize a shared interest in preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, and this is
reflected in common approaches to many issues. China has come a long
way from the 1960s, when its declaratory policy supported nuclear
proliferation as a means of ``breaking the hegemony of the
superpowers.'' Since then, as China has gained stature and influence in
world affairs and become a leading participant in such international
forums as the U.N. Security Council and the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament, it has increasingly come to appreciate that Chinese
national security interests are not served by the spread of dangerous
military capabilities, especially to areas close to China, and that
acceptance of international norms is one of the attributes and
responsibilities of great power status.
This evolving attitude toward nonproliferation norms can be seen in
Chinese actions in the 1990s.
In 1992, China acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a
measure the Chinese originally condemned.
In 1993, China signed the Chemical Weapon Convention,
which its National People's Congress approved last December.
In 1994, China stated that it would abide by the
guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) and would not export MTCR-controlled ground-to-ground missiles.
That same year, Beijing played a constructive role with
North Korea in promoting the October 1994 Agreed Framework, under which
the DPRK agreed to eliminate its nuclear weapons program.
Also in 1994, China joined with the U.S. in calling for
the negotiation of a multilateral agreement banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive
devices.
In 1995, China supported the successful effort to make
the NPT permanent.
In 1996, China stopped testing nuclear weapons and signed
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, perhaps the most difficult and
noteworthy decision taken to date, considering that China had conducted
far fewer nuclear tests than the United States and Russia.
This year, China joined with other members of the IAEA in
negotiating and then recommending that the IAEA Board of Governors
adopt a new safeguards arrangement that will strengthen the IAEA's
ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in states with
comprehensive safeguards agreements.
All of these steps were welcome indications of China's growing
support for nonproliferation. We need to build on such areas of common
ground. It is important in the future that China assume significantly
greater responsibility for helping to overcome pressing regional and
global proliferation challenges.
While China's support in achieving the Agreed Framework
with North Korea was important, we will need Beijing's active help more
than ever over the next several years in ensuring the effective
implementation of the Agreed Framework and bringing North Korea into
full compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.
China should play a more active and committed role in
helping to avert a destabilizing nuclear and missile competition in
South Asia, both by addressing India's concerns about threats to its
security and by ensuring that its traditional cooperation with Pakistan
does not include assistance inconsistent with international
nonproliferation norms.
As a Security Council member, a supplier of arms and
technology, and an oil importer, China should be more aware of the
responsibility it bears for stability in the Gulf region--in terms of
curbing exports to Iran and of giving the U.N. Special Commission and
the International Atomic Energy Agency full support in enforcing
Security Council resolutions on Iraq's proscribed weapons activities.
On the global level, we urge China to work with us and
other supporters of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty to break the
current impasse on the Treaty and to get negotiations on track.
As historically a major producer, user, and exporter of
anti-personnel landmines, China should play a more active role in
efforts to achieve a global ban on such weapons.
So there is a positive nonproliferation agenda with China where our
interests largely converge, where China has already taken important
steps, and where Chinese acceptance of greater responsibilities would
yield substantial benefits.
At the same time, we have had serious difficulties with China on
nonproliferation, and these difficulties have arisen largely over
Chinese exports of arms as well as sensitive goods and technologies,
primarily to Iran and Pakistan. It is noteworthy that these problems
have been confined primarily to two recipient states. But they are
nonetheless troublesome because those two states are located in regions
of tension and instability and both have active programs in the area of
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems--and, in the
case of Iran, because the recipient pursues a range of policies
threatening to its neighbors and inconsistent with international norms.
China's problematic record of exports can be attributed largely to
conscious decisions by Chinese leaders to pursue policies deemed to be
in China's national interest. In the case of Pakistan, this has
involved decisions to bolster the defense capabilities of a close and
long-standing friend against the perceived threat from India. In the
case of Iran, there has probably been more of a mixture of foreign
policy and commercial motivations. China has apparently wished to
establish good relations with a country it judged to be an important
factor in the future of the Gulf region and one with potential
influence over Islamic minorities in China's western provinces. But it
also wanted to earn hard currency for its exports and perhaps also help
ensure a source of oil for its growing energy needs. Conscious
governmental decisions in support of such policies probably explain
China's sale of conventional arms to Iran, its support for Pakistan's
missile programs, and its support, at least in the 1980s and even
beyond, to Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program.
But there is an additional factor that explains the lack of
sufficient Chinese export restraint. China still does not have an
effective national system to control exports of sensitive goods and
technologies. Even when Beijing is willing to exercise restraint, its
ability to do so in a substantial number of cases may be inadequate.
China's current ability to control exports appears to vary with the
type of commodity exported. Exports of specialized nuclear equipment
and technology, conventional weapons systems and technology, and
missile systems and specialized missile components and technology all
seem to be subject to centralized governmental approval procedures.
However, dual-use items in the nuclear, chemical, biological, and
missile areas--items that have both legitimate, civil applications as
well as more sensitive applications--are not necessarily controlled by
centralized or senior-level review and approval mechanisms. Indeed, we
have considerable evidence that decisions to export potentially
sensitive dual-use nuclear, chemical, and missile items are often taken
by Chinese manufacturing or exporting entities--even government-owned
or government-operated entities--without referral to central or high-
level authorities. This problem of inadequate control is compounded by
the rapid growth and decentralization of certain Chinese industries
(especially the chemical industry) and their incentives to make a
profit.
What this suggests is that efforts to discourage questionable
Chinese exports should proceed on two tracks. We must seek to persuade
China that a more restrained policy toward certain exports of arms and
dual-use goods and technologies would Serve China's security interests
by promoting regional and international stability and would bring
China's policies more into line with global norms. At the same time, we
should seek to cooperate with China in the strengthening of its
national export control mechanisms and procedures so that Beijing will
have more effective means of ensuring that exports by Chinese entities
fully conform to China's own national policies and international
commitments.
The issue of Chinese transfers of arms, equipment, and technology
has been pursued persistently with Chinese officials at all levels. We
have raised questions in the nuclear, chemical, missile, and
conventional arms areas.
In the nuclear area, we have long had concerns about China's
assistance to Pakistan's efforts to produce unsafeguarded fissile
materials and to Pakistan's program to develop nuclear explosives.
These concerns were especially acute in the 1980s but have continued
even after China acceded to the NPT in 1992. During 1995 we received
compelling information that a Chinese entity transferred a large number
of custom-built ring magnets to the entity in Pakistan responsible for
that country's unsafeguarded gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment program.
The information touched off intensive diplomatic activity with China in
early 1996 during which the U.S. sought information about the
circumstances surrounding the transfer and assurances about future
Chinese nuclear export policies. We concluded, on the basis of senior-
level Chinese statements as well as other information available to us,
that there was an insufficient basis to determine that central Chinese
governmental authorities knew in advance of the transfer or approved
it. We also received an important commitment for the future--a
statement on May 11, 1996 that China will not provide assistance to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
Since then, we have held several discussions with the Chinese aimed
at building on the May 11 understanding and ensuring that the two aides
have a common understanding of it. We have also watched China's
nuclear-related cooperation and export activities very carefully. What
we can say so far is that Beijing appears to be taking the May 11
commitment seriously. While we have raised concerns with Beijing about
certain activities and incidents, we have no basis to conclude that
China has acted inconsistently with its May commitment. Chinese nuclear
authorities already seem to have tightened up their own review
procedures. More importantly, China has notified us that it is
developing nuclear export control regulations that, for the first time,
would control both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items on a
nationwide basis. In addition, at U.S. urging, China is now considering
joining the Zangger NPT Exporters Committee, which would facilitate
China's familiarization with and adoption of international nuclear
export control norms and practices. We are encouraging Beijing both to
adopt its nuclear export control regulations as well as to join the
Zangger Committee as soon as possible in 1997.
We are also urging China not to engage in nuclear cooperation with
Iran. We recognize that Chinese cooperation with Iran is carried out
under IAEA safeguards and is consistent with Beijing's international
obligations. Nonetheless, we tell the Chinese what we tell all other
nuclear suppliers--that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program
and that any nuclear cooperation with Tehran risks being misused to
advance that program. In 1995, China suspended the sale of two nuclear
power reactors to Iran, probably as a result of siting and financing
difficulties. Whatever the reason, it was a positive step, and we will
continue to call on China to curtail its nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Our intensive engagement with the Chinese over the last few years
on nuclear export issues has begun to yield some concrete results. We
have seen a greater willingness by the Chinese to scrutinize and
restrain their nuclear exports and cooperative activities, to
strengthen their national export controls, and to address more promptly
and seriously the concerns we have raised. More work needs to be done,
however, to ensure that the two countries have a common understanding
of their nuclear export control responsibilities. If we continue to
make progress, we would hope to be in a position before long for
President Clinton to make the legislatively-required certifications to
Congress that would enable the long-dormant 1985 U.S.-China Agreement
for Nuclear Cooperation to be implemented, which would bring major
benefits to both countries. Our laws require the President to certify,
in effect, that China is not assisting any non-nuclear weapons state in
the acquisition of nuclear explosive capabilities.
In the area of chemical-related exports, we are pleased that the
National People's Congress approved the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) late last year, and we hope that China--and the United States,
too--will be able to deposit its instrument of ratification before
April 29 in order to become an original party. We also welcome China's
adoption in December 1995 of its chemical export control regulation and
the supplement to that regulation issued in March of this year. We are
deeply concerned, however, by the discrepancy between these positive
steps and substantial information available to us that various Chinese
entities have transferred chemical precursors, chemical production
equipment, and production technology to Iran, which we expect will use
them in its chemical weapons program, one of the most active in the
world today.
These dual-use chemical-related transfers to Iran indicate that, at
a minimum, China's chemical export controls are not operating
effectively enough to ensure compliance with China's prospective CWC
obligation not to assist anyone in any way to acquire chemical weapons.
We have raised our concerns frankly with Chinese officials and urged
that they take vigorous steps to restrain the activities of Chinese
entities from assisting Iran's CW program and to strengthen China's
chemical export control system. No responsible party to the CWC can
afford to take a ``see no evil, hear no evil'' approach to export
controls. We have also told the Chinese that we are actively examining
the questionable transactions of which we are aware with a view to
determining whether they meet the requirements of our sanctions law.
Concerns about Chinese missile-related exports have applied mainly
to PRC cooperation with Pakistan and Iran. In 1991 and again in 1993,
we imposed sanctions on Chinese entities for transferring to Pakistan
equipment and technology for the M-11 missile system. In October 1994,
we lifted then-existing sanctions when China agreed to reaffirm its
commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines and parameters and to ban
the export worldwide of MTCR-controlled ground-to-ground missiles.
Since that 1994 agreement, we have had no reason to believe that China
has violated its pledge not to export such missiles. However, concerns
about transfers of missile-related components, technology, and
production technology persist, raising serious questions about the
nature of China's commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines.
At a minimum, the Chinese do not appear to interpret their
responsibilities under the guidelines as restrictively as we do, or as
other MTCR members do. (Although China states that it abides by the
MTCR guidelines, it is not a member of the multilateral regime.)
Moreover, as we have learned more about current Chinese procedures for
controlling missile-related goods and services, we have become more
skeptical about the ability of Beijing's control system to implement
missile restraints effectively. We will continue to urge the Chinese to
live up to their October 1994 commitment, to interpret that commitment
meaningfully, and to put in place the control regulations and
procedures that would enable them to fulfill it conscientiously. In
addition, we will need to review the applicability of relevant
provisions of U.S. law.
Another concern we have often raised with Beijing is China's sale
of conventional arms to Iran. In the last few years, China has become
the leading source of arms for Tehran, now that the 33 members of the
new Wassenaar Arrangement have agreed to end their sales. We have urged
China to join those 33 suppliers in not trading in arms and sensitive
technologies with Iran.
We are particularly concerned by the transfer of C-802 anti-ship
cruise missles. Such missiles, whether installed on land or on patrol
boats also supplied by China, will add to the maritime advantage that
Iran already enjoys over other Gulf states and will put commercial
shipping in the Gulf at risk. Especially troubling to us is that these
cruise missiles pose new, direct threats to deployed U.S. forces.
The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act provides for sanctions
against those whose defense cooperation with Iran enables it to acquire
``destabilizing numbers and types'' of conventional weapons. We have
concluded that the C-802 transfers that have occurred so far are not of
a destabilizing number and type. However, we are very concerned about
these transfers, and will continue to monitor Chinese and Iranian
activity for any additional transfers that might cross the threshold of
sanctionable activity.
Mr. Chairman, in reviewing areas of U.S. concern about Chinese
exports, I may have provided the impression that the U.S.-Chinese
nonproliferation agenda is mainly and inevitably a contentious one.
When the two sides sit down together, usually under severe time
constraints, it is perhaps natural that discussions tend to focus on
particularly pressing concerns. But as I indicated earlier, the United
States and China share a fundamental interest in preventing the spread
of destabilizing arms and technologies, and this shared interest has
already been reelected in a range of common or at least similar
policies on a wide range of global and regional issues. Indeed, even on
the difficult issue of exports to third parties, we have found that
persistent, frank engagement has begun to produce concrete progress,
especially in the nuclear area. The sooner we can resolve these
outstanding problems, the sooner the U.S. and China can devote more of
their energies to working together cooperatively to address the world's
critical proliferation challenges.
The period ahead will be a very active one for U.S.-Chinese
diplomacy. We will seek in the course of the many upcoming high-level
meetings, including the exchange of state visits, to put the bilateral
relationship on a steady, promising course that can take us well into
the 21st century. But as we pursue our policy of engagement, we will
continue to remind the Chinese that a key ingredient of a sound, closer
relationship is a shared respect for international nonproliferation
norms. If we can work together effectively to overcome the relatively
few proliferation disagreements that exist, we can give a significant
boost to U.S.-China relations. But if we fail to solve outstanding
problems, they will come back to haunt us and they will impede the
improved relationship both sides seek.
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