[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-134]
ADDRESSING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR
CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING THE
MILITARY OPTIONS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 20, 2012
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-143 WASHINGTON : 2012
___________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer
Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or
866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, June 20, 2012, Addressing the Iranian Nuclear
Challenge: Understanding the Military Options.................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, June 20, 2012......................................... 43
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2012
ADDRESSING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY
OPTIONS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Albright, David, President, Institute for Science and
International Security......................................... 9
Rademaker, Stephen, Task Force Member, National Security Project,
Bipartisan Policy Center....................................... 5
Robb, Charles, Task Force Co-Chair, National Security Project,
Bipartisan Policy Center....................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Albright, David.............................................. 71
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 47
Rademaker, Stephen........................................... 61
Robb, Charles................................................ 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 85
Mr. Forbes................................................... 85
Mr. Turner................................................... 85
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 90
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 93
Mr. Kissell.................................................. 92
Mr. Langevin................................................. 89
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 93
Ms. Speier................................................... 95
ADDRESSING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY
OPTIONS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 20, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed
Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from
experts on the nuclear challenge from Iran.
The expert panel includes former Senator Charles Robb, a
task force co-chair of the National Security Project with the
Bipartisan Policy Center; Mr. Steven Rademaker, a task force
member of the National Security Project with the Bipartisan
Policy Center; and Mr. David Albright, the President of the
Institute for Science and International Security.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today.
The Iranian nuclear program is among the most complex
foreign policy and national security challenges that the United
States faces today. Intensive diplomatic and economic steps
focused on Iran's nuclear program have been undertaken over the
last decade to dissuade Iran from pursuing a military nuclear
program. Unfortunately, it does not appear that these efforts
have succeeded in convincing the Iranians to abandon its
military nuclear ambitions.
The United States' stated policy remains that Iran should
not process a nuclear weapon, as reflected by President Obama's
recent comments in which he stated, ``I think both the Iranian
and Israeli governments recognize that when the United States
says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we
mean what we say.'' Moreover, President Obama has explicitly
declared that his Administration would use force--a ``military
component''--as a last resort to prevent Tehran from acquiring
a bomb. However, this message has not always been consistent
across administrations, and, unfortunately, it is not clear
that the Iranian regime is deterred by such statements.
I personally agree that all elements of national power
should be brought to bear to prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon. I certainly recognize that no military
operation is without risk, but given the fact that the
President has stated that military options may have to be
utilized to thwart Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, it is
the committee's responsibility to ensure that the military
option is credible. Moreover, any consideration of a U.S.
military response to Iran's nuclear developments requires
rigorous and thoughtful evaluation, which is why we are holding
this hearing today.
If diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to stop Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon capability, then a military option
may be the only recourse. Therefore, it is critical to
rigorously study and understand all facets of any military
option, including how it supports our vital national security
interests, its potential for effectiveness, its risks, Iran's
potential responses, the implications for the region.
Likewise, effective military capability in the region could
be a useful deterrent and improve regional stability, negating
the need for a military strike.
Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before the committee
today, and I look forward to your testimony and insights into
the nuclear challenge from Iran.
Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think your
opening remarks set the stage very well.
And I do look forward to the testimony. This is a very
thorny and difficult problem. We need all the expert advice we
can get. So we are very happy to have you gentlemen here today,
and, as I said, we look forward to your testimony.
It is not an easy problem, because we all recognize the
fact we do not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. I think
there is bipartisan agreement on that. Certainly, the President
has stated his policy very strongly, and so have the national
security leaders in the Republican Party that containment is
not an option. We can't say it is okay if Iran gets a nuclear
weapon and then we will figure out how to deal with it. It is
our policy to stop them from getting a nuclear weapon and to
put all options on the table, including the option of military
action if that is necessary, to achieve our policy of stopping
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
The difficulty, of course, is that the military option is
costly and risky, and there is not even a guarantee that it
would necessarily stop Iran from developing the nuclear weapon.
It is worth noting that even the very much celebrated military
option that Israel used against Iraq in the early 1980s
ultimately did not stop Iraq, as we discovered when we went in
in 1991. They were much further along toward a nuclear weapon
than we had even realized.
So the risks of the military option are very real, not to
mention the potential for destabilizing the region in a full-
scale war that I don't think any of us want and certainly no
one in the region wants, which is why it is so critical that we
be as aggressive as possible on the sanctions side to put
maximum pressure on Iran to force them to the negotiating table
and force them to not take this step.
I think it is also, however, worth noting that Iran has not
yet said, ``We are building a nuclear weapon.'' And all of the
expert testimony we have received has said they have not
stepped across that line. In fact, I am always mindful of the
fact that--and I could be off a little bit here, but I think it
was 7 years ago when I first heard that Iran would have a
nuclear weapon within 6 months. They didn't, and they don't.
And it is a very complicated decision for Iran to figure
out whether or not to step across that line. Our job is to make
sure that they understand clearly the maximum cost that they
will pay if they do step across that line, both in terms of
sanctions and in terms of saying that the military option
remains on the table.
But given all the risks associated with the military
option, it is my opinion that right now we need to aggressively
pursue the sanctions and diplomacy option and should not
lightly walk away from that option. Because the consequences of
walking away from that option are either, A, Iran gets a
nuclear weapon or, B, we face the possibility of a war that
none of us want.
It is not an easy problem to solve. I don't think we are
going to solve it this morning. But I do look forward to the
testimony because it is something that every Member of this
committee needs to get a very strong understanding of. These
are critical, critical policy decisions going forward.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Robb, we will hear from you first, then Mr.
Rademaker, then Mr. Albright, please.
Senator.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES ROBB, TASK FORCE CO-CHAIR, NATIONAL
SECURITY PROJECT, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER
Mr. Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Smith and Members
of the committee.
I would have to observe from your opening statements that I
don't think this is going to be a particularly contentious
hearing. And we appreciate very much the fact that, in crafting
your legislation, you have borrowed or at least used some of
the phraseology and certainly some of the intent and
explanation that we had included in some of our reports.
I am here, as is Steve Rademaker, representing the
Bipartisan Policy Center. This was formed in 2007 by four
former majority leaders over on the other side of the Hill:
Howard Baker and Bob Dole on the Republican side and George
Mitchell and Tom Daschle on the Democratic side. And it has
been working to find ways to promote evidence-based,
politically viable solutions to some of the most pressing
policy challenges that face our country. And, certainly, this
particular challenge is as serious as anything we are facing
today.
I have had the privilege of co-chairing the Iran Nuclear
Task Force for the last 4 years. Initially, the co-chair on the
other side was Dan Coats when he was a former Senator. When he
opted to return to the Senate, General Chuck Wald has been the
co-chairman since that period of time.
But the Bipartisan Policy Center always works in a
bipartisan way so that members of both sides of the aisle are
represented and tries to work in ways that advance the causes
rather than gets bogged down in what sometimes would be
described as the political crossfire. But we don't attempt to
run away from the tough issues it faces.
Our first task force, as a matter of fact, 4 years ago
included two members, Dennis Ross and Ash Carter, who were
subsequently asked by President-elect Obama to come into his
Administration. But we have had bipartisan representation on
the committee at all times. Our current committee has four
former Democratic Members of Congress. It has three retired
four-star generals and admirals, and specific policy experts,
like Steve Rademaker on my left, who will be testifying
momentarily, and others who constitute a group of people who
are experienced and understand the challenges.
There is, as you said and as Mr. Smith said, there is
widespread agreement that preventing Iran nuclear weapons
capability is our most urgent national security challenge, but
there is less agreement on how best to meet that challenge.
Despite sanctions, Stuxnet, and now Flame, Iran continues to
enrich uranium faster and to higher levels than ever before. A
peaceful, viable, negotiated solution has always been, in our
judgment, in the United States' best interest. But the dual
approach of diplomacy and sanctions simply have not proved to
be enough. We need the third track, and that is credible and
visible preparations for a military option. An additional
leverage is the only way to enable a peaceful and negotiated
credible settlement, in the view of this particular task force.
History shows us that the best chance for inducing Iran
concessions is when it is in a dire and military threat. The
Iran-Iraq war is one example. More recently, Iran suspended its
nuclear program in 2003 after Saddam Hussein was toppled. It is
the credible threat of force when pursued together with
diplomacy and sanctions that proves the best hope for peace, in
the judgment of this particular task force.
The three components of a military threat are: first, an
information and messaging strategy, sending strong public
signals about American resolve and visible preparation for
potential conflict. Congress can certainly help the U.S. public
in a serious and frank discussion of the risk of a nuclear-
capable Iran by holding hearings on this subject, just as you
are doing today, and we applaud the committee for holding this
hearing.
Second, economic preparations. The U.S. has to work to
mitigate the economic impact of a strike on Iran's nuclear
capability, which would undoubtedly halt Iran's oil exports, at
least temporarily. And the DOE [Department of Energy] needs to
conduct a study to determine a realistic rate of release for
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
The third element is credible military readiness
activities, like augmenting the Fifth Fleet's capacity by
procuring and deploying force-protection munitions to defend
U.S. naval forces against potential Iranian retaliation; by
prepositioning military supplies across the region, including
strategic bombers, bunker-buster munitions and fuel; by
exploring strategic partnerships with countries on Iran's
northern perimeter, such as Azerbaijan; by conducting broad
military exercises with the regional allies--some of these
things have been done, are being done; by strengthening the
U.S. Air Force capabilities for an effective strike, including
expediting production and deployment of the Massive Ordnance
Penetrator; by augmenting Israeli offensive and defensive
capabilities, including the sale to Israel of three KC-135
aerial refueling tankers and 200 GBU-31 bunker-busting
munitions needed and whatever missile defense systems are
needed.
We are not urging Israel to take unilateral military action
against Iran's nuclear facilities, but we need to make their
capability to do so stronger so that Iran will take that threat
more seriously.
Mr. Chairman, we are not advocating another war in this
region. We would like to see this perilous situation resolved
peacefully. We applaud the President for offering an open hand
to a closed fist in his very first few minutes as President,
but diplomacy simply hasn't done the job. Iran has refused to
negotiate in good faith, while it continues to ignore U.N.
[United Nations] resolutions, threatens to wipe out our
strongest ally in the region off the face of this earth, and
keeps those centrifuges spinning.
Our Nation's credibility is at stake. Two successive
administrations have said that a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran
is unacceptable and that all elements of our Nation's power
will be employed to keep it from happening. Merely talking
about red lines and keeping everything on the table, however,
is not by itself enough. We have to have the resolve to act if
necessary, or our ability to protect our allies, much less our
own interests in the region and around the world, will be
dramatically reduced and will simply kill the NPT [Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty]. It will cause nations like Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Turkey, and other regional partners to feel compelled to
initiate their own nuclear programs, and we will end up with
two nuclear states, without a neutral intermediary, facing what
could be Armageddon.
That may be a slightly overdramatic summary of what we see
as the problem, but there is bipartisan agreement on the
challenge that we face. And we very much appreciate the fact
that this committee has invited us to come and share some
thoughts and to respond to whatever questions you and the other
Members of the committee may have.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will turn it over to Steve
Rademaker to take up some of the technical questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robb can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rademaker.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN RADEMAKER, TASK FORCE MEMBER, NATIONAL
SECURITY PROJECT, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER
Mr. Rademaker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Smith, for the opportunity to testify before you today on this
very important subject.
It has been my privilege for over 4 years now to serve with
Senator Robb and some other very distinguished individuals on
the Bipartisan Policy Center's Task Force on Iran. And I am,
again, grateful for the opportunity to be able to present some
of our findings and recommendations to you today.
We issued our first report in September of 2008, and, at
that time, we concluded that ``a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran
is strategically untenable.'' And that was carefully negotiated
language within our task force, as Senator Robb knows. And we
also recommended a triple-track strategy for addressing that
threat. And as Senator Robb indicated, those three tracks are
diplomacy, sanctions, and the credible threat that, should the
first two tracks fail to solve the problem, military force
could be used.
The consistent view of our task force over the last 4 years
as we have issued successive reports on this issue has been
that, of the three tracks that we recommend, the third one, the
threat that force would be used if the other tracks fail, is
the most underdeveloped of the three tracks. And by that, I
think I would stress that it is pretty evident that the United
States is interested in a diplomatic solution. Our negotiators
have been in Moscow this week seeking to achieve a negotiated
settlement to this problem. So I don't think the Iranians doubt
that there is a willingness on the part of the United States to
engage in diplomacy on this.
Likewise, sanctions. Both the Obama administration and the
U.S. Congress have been actively seeking to tighten U.S.
sanctions on Iran. And in that regard, I do want to say as a
former congressional staffer, I think the role of the United
States Congress in tightening U.S. sanctions has been
absolutely critical. And I know there is additional sanctions
legislation pending, but I think it is something that has been
and will continue to be essential to bringing the kind of
pressure to bear on Iran that will be needed to bring about a
solution to this problem.
But, again, we feel that the third element is, at this
point, underdeveloped. And by that, I think what we mean is
that we don't think that Iran is sufficiently persuaded that
military force really is in prospect should they fail to come
to an acceptable solution, an acceptable agreement to the
problem. And our most recent report, issued in February,
outlines some measures that we think would be necessary to make
that threat more credible to the Iranians. And, in our
judgment, should we succeed in doing that, the likelihood of a
successful diplomatic solution would increase.
Senator Robb has outlined what some of those steps might
be, and I am not going to belabor them again, except to echo
him in saying that the role of this committee has been very
helpful on that. The provisions you included in the National
Defense Authorization Act that are consistent with some of the
recommendations we made in February I think are very important
and very timely, and I hope that the Senate will agree to them
when you ultimately reach conference on that bill.
Now, the real focus of my testimony is to be not so much on
the steps that the U.S. might take to increase the credibility
of the third track but, rather, to focus on the nature of the
Iranian threat. And there I need to make a point at the outset
that for Iran, as for any country that seeks nuclear weapons,
the biggest challenge is obtaining the fissile material
necessary to produce a weapon. And that is typically either
enriched uranium or plutonium. And that is why Iran's uranium-
enrichment program is so critically important, because that is
the pathway that they have developed that would enable them to
produce the fissile material that they would need for a weapon.
And so, ever since that program was discovered in 2002, it
has been the focus of international efforts to get them to end
their uranium-enrichment program. And I note in that regard
that since 2006 their continued operation of that program has
been illegal under international law, because beginning in
2006, the U.N. Security Council began adopting binding
resolutions demanding that--legally binding resolutions
demanding that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. And, at this
point, a total of six such resolutions have been adopted by the
U.N. Security Council. Iran has simply ignored all those
resolutions. But the upshot is that what Iran is doing today is
a violation of international law.
At the Bipartisan Policy Center, we have monitored the
progress of Iran's enrichment program because that is a good
measure of the degree to which they are succeeding in achieving
the nuclear weapons capability that we said is untenable in our
first report. And we are very much assisted in trying to
monitor that program by the work of the International Atomic
Energy Agency because they issue quarterly reports on the
progress of Iran's enrichment program.
The most recent IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
report came out on May 25th of this year, and in some ways it
is the most troubling of any of the reports we have seen in
recent years. It indicated that, as of May, Iran had produced
3,345 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent. That is 10
times as much enriched uranium as they had at the time we
issued our first report in 2008. And with further enrichment,
we calculate that that is enough 3.5-percent enriched uranium
to produce at least two nuclear weapons. I believe David
Albright's organization estimates that is actually enough for
five nuclear weapons. But it is a substantial amount of
enriched uranium that they have accumulated at this point.
The rate at which they are producing enriched uranium,
according to the last report, is the highest rate ever. It was
158 kilograms per month, which is 37 percent higher than they
had achieved in any previous reporting period. And it is three
times the rate of production prior to the Stuxnet virus, which
many people have suggested somehow crippled their program. But
today they are enriching uranium three times faster than they
were able to enrich it prior to Stuxnet. So Stuxnet may have
set them back but not by very much, at least not sufficiently.
They are operating more centrifuges today than ever,
although the increase in the number of centrifuges in the last
reporting period was very modest. And, as a result, that 37
percent increase in the production rate wasn't because they had
deployed additional centrifuges. It is because they are
managing to operate their existing centrifuges more
efficiently, which is, in some ways, even more troubling than
deploying additional centrifuges.
They are also enriching to a higher level, the 20-percent
level, which gets them closing to bomb-grade enriched uranium.
And their production rate of that was 25 percent higher during
the last reporting period, 25 percent higher than in any
previous reporting period. Taken together with what they are
doing in uranium enrichment, they are now able to produce at
least one bomb's worth of enriched material every year, enough
3.5-percent enriched uranium to ultimately produce a weapon
with it with further enrichment.
Also troubling, in the last report, the IAEA revealed that
they had discovered uranium particles enriched to the level of
27 percent, which is a higher level than Iran has declared that
it is prepared to enrich to. The meaning of that is not readily
apparent, but it certainly underscores that Iran has the
ability to enrich to much higher levels than 20 percent.
And you may have noted yesterday, their negotiator in Iran
insisted that they have an inalienable right under
international law to enrich to whatever level they want to. And
they have demonstrated that they are prepared to go--or, at
least, they can go above 20 percent.
As a result of all of the progress that has been measured
by the IAEA, it is clear that Iran could produce a nuclear
weapon very quickly should it wish to do so. The Bipartisan
Policy Center has engaged an expert in this area named Gregory
Jones, and he has undertaken a number of calculations for us.
He calculates that with their existing stockpile of enriched
material, they could, if they were bound and determined to do
it, produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within
35 to 106 days. From a decision to go forward, it would take
them 35 to 106 days to actually have the fissile material for a
weapon. I think David Albright's organization calculates a
slightly different number. They estimate 4 months, I believe,
or 120 days--a slight difference there but not a profound
difference, I would argue.
Also, according to Gregory Jones' calculation, this more
highly enriched uranium, this 20-percent enriched uranium, by
the end of this year they are predicted to have enough of that
that, with further enrichment of just that 20-percent material,
they could have a weapon within 8 days, should they wish to go
full speed in that direction. Again, David Albright's
organization comes up with a slightly different number for
that. I think your number is 30 days, but--minimum of 30 days
to produce a weapon. Not today, but probably by the end of the
year.
Anyway, we don't throw these numbers out because we predict
that Iran is going to do these things. In fact, there are a lot
of reasons why it wouldn't make much sense for Iran to proceed
in that manner. But it does provide a measurement of their
progress and how far they have come in the direction of
achieving the nuclear weapons capability that we have contended
for 4 years now would be strategically untenable.
And I think, with that, I will end my testimony and
entertain questions after the testimony of Mr. Albright.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker can be found in
the Appendix on page 61.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Albright.
STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Albright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Smith, for
giving me the opportunity to testified today.
I agree with my colleagues----
The Chairman. Is your mike on?
Mr. Albright. Is it on? Is it better now?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Albright. I think it was on; I wasn't close enough.
I agree with my colleagues and with you that one of the
greatest national security challenges facing the United States
is Iran's nuclear effort. We really don't know if they are
going to decide to build a nuclear weapon, but the indications
are at least that they are on a trajectory to do so. I
personally believe that they are being deterred now from moving
forward. They would be much further along now if there hadn't
been this deterrence and also a great deal of actions that have
slowed down their program.
Now, does that mean that we can find a negotiated solution
that provides assurance that Iran will not build nuclear
weapons? And, like many, I am not sure about that. I do have
hopes. And I think that is the correct course of action, is to
pursue negotiations.
As was pointed out, President Obama has stated that the
U.S. will prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. And that
policy means that if Iran moves to build nuclear weapons, the
United States will act to stop it from succeeding. I think that
is fairly clear. And I also believe that he means it when he
says that military options are on the table, and I would judge
that he probably would use them. And so I view his threat of
military actions as genuine.
Now, as the point has been made, though, there has been
little discussion of the implementation or implications of this
U.S. policy. And, clearly, military strikes are risky,
potentially very costly, could start a war that we don't want.
And there is also no easy military way to end Iran's nuclear
program. Surgical strikes, I would argue, will simply not work,
at least by themselves. A sustained widespread bombing attack
can likely stop an Iranian breakout to build nuclear weapons.
And that is really dependent on the current status and nature
of Iran's nuclear program today and as we would envision it
would be in the next year or so.
But how will Iran respond? As I said, will we enter a
lengthy war? And what do we do the day after military strikes
or even a campaign? And, certainly, I am no expert on the first
two, judging whether Iran will launch a war or trying to figure
out exactly their response. But I would like to make one
statement about the last question, that if military strikes do
occur, despite all attempts to avoid them, and it follows an
Iranian breakout, there is a real necessity to try to figure
out a way or a strategy that would impose conditions on Iran to
ensure that it does not try to build nuclear weapons in the
future, that we can't just bomb and walk away. And so I think
that is an extreme challenge but an absolutely necessary one to
consider and start putting into place long before we think of
actually carrying out any kind of military strike, if that is
the way it develops.
Now, one question I was asked to look at is, will the
President know if Iran moves to build nuclear weapons in the
immediate future? And I would say that it is extremely
important to know if Iran can, in a sense, sneak out, where we
don't have any idea that they have built nuclear weapons. And I
think our assessments would say, not in the near future. And I
would put the timeframe as this year and next that the
President will likely know. And, again, it is because of the
current status of Iran's nuclear program.
Moreover, the U.S. will have enough time for a range of
responses. Although, as time progresses, these response times
will likely start to shrink absent either a negotiated
reduction in Iranian nuclear capabilities or other actions that
precipitate a slowdown in Iran's nuclear programs. And that
could be caused by themselves.
And a key consideration in evaluating U.S. policy is the
timeline for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons following the
decision to do so. And Steve has talked about these various
timelines, and I would like to just go through some of ours. He
actually did capture most of them, but I would like to just
expand on them a little bit.
Right now, we think that Iran would need about a year, give
a couple of months, to actually build a crude nuclear
explosive, and longer if it needed to put one on a missile. It
could be significantly longer than a year. But as Steve pointed
out, the long pole in the tent of an Iranian effort is Iran's
lack of sufficient weapon-grade uranium. We assess that they
don't have any in sufficient quantity for a bomb and that that
remains their priority if they were to break out.
Now, there is a question, is one weapon enough? And in
discussing breakout, many argue that they wouldn't even try
until they had enough, or a pathway, and I would say a pathway
in order to get several nuclear weapons. And one component is
low-enriched uranium, but there are other components to that
pathway also that Iran needs to put in place. And an ideal
pathway for them is a secret centrifuge plant, fully
operational, outfitted with advanced centrifuges able to
produce weapon-grade uranium at a far faster rate than they are
today. And I will mention that, at the end, they are not there
yet, and we don't think they will be for at least a year, if
not longer.
So Iran is limited in its ability to break out. And, as
Steve pointed out, it would depend on the stock of LEU [low-
enriched uranium] to speed up its, you know, what is often
called the dash to the bomb. Because we don't think they have a
secret centrifuge plant, they are going to have to use their
existing centrifuge plants to carry out a breakout. And today,
if Iran decided to build a nuclear weapon, decided to dash to
weapon-grade uranium, we think would it take Iran at least 4
months in order to have sufficient weapon-grade uranium for a
nuclear explosive device.
Our calculations are done by a University of Virginia
faculty member of the engineering department who used to head
the U.S. centrifuge program, or at least the theoretical
division, I am sorry, of the centrifuge program, and has
decades of experience doing these calculations. And one of the
things that he emphasizes--his name is Houston Wood. But one of
the things he emphasizes is that there is a lot of problems in
making weapon-grade uranium. A lot of inefficiencies develop as
you try to do that that slow you down. And that is one of the
reasons why we are at 4 months. I think Greg Jones is at a
lower rate, although his upper bound is in response, I think,
to our prodding on this issue, and we appreciate that.
But, nonetheless, it is a challenging chore, and the
theoretical calculations suggest a longer period of time
necessary. And that is setting aside the inherent problems in
these types of Iranian centrifuges. They call it the IR-1. It
actually dates back to a Dutch centrifuge built in the 1970s
that was stolen by a Pakistani and then eventually delivered to
Iran. And that centrifuge lost out in the competition inside
this enrichment program in Europe to a German design. And the
reason it lost out is it breaks a lot.
And that has been one of the persistent problems with the
Iranian centrifuge program, is unexpected stoppage of
centrifuges and breakage, excessive breakage, of the
centrifuges. And if you are rushing to make weapon-grade
uranium, your supplies of, let's say, 20 percent are just
enough, you may not end up with enough weapon-grade uranium
once you start turning on those centrifuges to make the weapon-
grade uranium.
There are a lot of problems. And I can go into more detail
about that, but it is one of the reasons we think Iran will not
break out soon but is concentrating on developing advanced
centrifuges which are based on the German design that beat out
this Dutch design. And that Iran is trying in its own way,
modifying it to try to develop that.
Now, Steve mentioned the 20 percent and that is what we are
all watching because again, the closer you get, the faster you
can get to weapon-grade uranium. And so we are watching that.
We agree with their estimates, end of this year, early next
year, they could have enough of this--it is near 20 percent, we
call it for a nuclear weapon in the sense that if further
enriched they would have enough weapon-grade uranium.
However, in our calculations--again, these are based on
Houston Wood's calculations--we see that they are going to need
a longer time. And if they want to do a rapid breakout, down to
a month, let's say--and this, again, is in theory; we view it
as a minimal--they are going to have to use the Natanz fuel-
enrichment plant to do that. Fordow will not do it fast enough.
And we are not even sure how many centrifuges will be at Fordow
at that time. It may not be fully outfitted. And so you may be
talking months and months to break out at Fordow at the start
of next year.
Now, at Natanz, they can do it much quicker because they
have many, many more centrifuges there. But Natanz remains very
vulnerable to military strikes, and this breakout will be
detected. It may not be the first day or the first week, but
certainly by the second week, third week, either IAEA
monitoring or U.S. intelligence will likely detect this kind of
breakout and be able to respond. So I think even as the
response times come down, there is still time to respond
promptly. But I will grant that detection of a breakout becomes
more difficult and the preparation for response needs to be
accelerated.
Now, one of the issues we are wrestling with is if Iran can
built a secret centrifuge plant and develop the advanced
centrifuges. Right now, Iran is having trouble with its
advanced centrifuges. One of the benefits of sanctions has been
forcing them to face material shortages of raw materials. They
have been forced to make design changes in the centrifuge
design. In the case of one that they have been trying to
develop, it looks like the centrifuge may not work because
their design change may be flawed. They are having a hard time
getting certain raw materials that allow them to build large
numbers of these modified advanced centrifuges.
And so we can't predict when they will succeed, but, again,
the program is moving much slower than I think we expected, and
we expect delays to continue. But, nonetheless, at some point
they will succeed. And I think in our own estimations, the end
of next year becomes a much bigger problem in order to
predict--or let me say this, detect and respond to an Iranian
breakout.
In our own assessments, we feel pretty confident that the
next year the President will clearly detect a breakout.
Breakout times will be sufficiently long to allow a response.
And what that would do, we think, is will deter Iran from even
trying, because they understand that the United States military
response could actually stop their ability to build nuclear
weapons.
Now, we certainly would recommend that whatever efforts can
be done to improve our detection capabilities, either through
the IAEA insisting on better safeguards at the enrichment
plants--in a sense, they are there more often, so they can
detect a diversion more quickly, I think is very desirable.
U.S. intelligence capability certainly should be--and you would
obviously do this--supported to improve detection times. And so
I think there is a range of those kinds of things that need to
be done.
Now, the twin goals should be preventing Iran from getting
nuclear weapons while avoiding military actions. And I believe
this can be done, but more needs to be done to ensure that both
goals are accomplished. And I would agree with my colleagues
that, ironically, to prevent war, Iran must believe in its
heart that the U.S. will strike if it moves to build nuclear
weapons. And I think in doing that, the United States can deter
Iran from even trying. But, nonetheless, this puts U.S. policy
on a knife's edge.
So thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright can be found in the
Appendix on page 71.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Robb and Mr. Rademaker, enhancing the credibility
of the military option, such as prepositioning military assets
and supplies in the regions, as you advocate in your BPC
[Bipartisan Policy Center] report, in concert with vigorous
diplomacy and crippling economic sanctions should be a key
component of the overall strategy to prevent Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon capability.
Representative Conaway, a Member of the committee here,
introduced a bill, H.R. 4485, that reflects many of the BPC's
recommendations. Much of the bill was incorporated as part of
this year's Defense Authorization Act, which we have passed
through the House. We are waiting for the Senate to take their
action.
Do you support these legislative actions? And are there
other specific legislative actions that the U.S. Congress
should be taking to enhance the credibility of the military
option?
Mr. Robb. Mr. Chairman, we support those aspects----
The Chairman. Is your mike on?
Mr. Robb. It is not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, we support those aspects of the defense
authorization bill that incorporate the recommendations that
have been made by the Bipartisan Policy Center. We would not,
since we have not taken up some of the other provisions of the
defense authorization bill, would not comment on those.
But we, number one, support and appreciate the fact that
this committee has taken the recommendations that were
contained in this, which is our most recent publication--I
brought two of the other publications with me. I couldn't find
the third in that list of publications. But while there have
been tweaks and variations that have been discovered with
additional intelligence, with additional technical
understanding of the issues, the reports have really been
consistent.
And so, to the extent that the language that you have
included adopts language which is either very similar to or at
least supports the same approach, we are very much in support
of that provision of the defense authorization bill that you
have crafted.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rademaker. Yes, if I could add to that, we were very
much gratified to see Mr. Conaway's bill and the decision of
this committee to incorporate much of that bill into your
Defense Authorization Act.
In response to your question of whether there is more that
Congress could do, the answer is, yes, there is more that
Congress could do.
One of our other recommendations related to strengthening
the credibility of the Israeli military threat against Iran, as
well as the U.S. military threat--and I am pleased to say that
those recommendations have also been picked up in legislation
that has already passed the House of Representatives. That was
a bill, H.R. 4133, that was cosponsored by Mr. Cantor, the
majority leader, and Mr. Hoyer, the Democratic whip. It was
called the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation
Act of 2012. And among other things, it called on the United
States to provide Israel with additional aerial refueling
tankers, missile defense capabilities, and specialized
munitions such as bunker busters. And, again, that was one of
our recommendations in our most recent report.
So, hopefully--that bill is now before the Senate, or
corresponding legislation is before the Senate. And, last week,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously voted it out
of committee. So I think there is a good chance that this is
one bill that will actually reach the President's desk.
The Chairman. Good.
Some have suggested that Congress should pass an
Authorization for the Use of Military Force to prevent Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon, thereby sending a signal that
Congress supports all options at the President's disposal.
Others might say that this legislative action is premature and
too provocative.
In your view, under what circumstances would an
authorization for the use of military force be appropriate?
Mr. Robb. Well, Mr. Chairman, to the extent that any bill
passed by Congress supports the President's ability to carry
out whatever military actions that he and the Defense
Department, in consultation with Congress, hopefully, in all
areas, believes is necessary, we would support.
If the bill were to actually require a specific either
declaration of--would provide a specific declaration of war or
would require a time specific for action to be taken without
some leeway for discretion and the evaluation of the
circumstances, we would not suggest--or at least on the basis
of my own judgment, I think it would be unwise to attempt to
tie the President's hands. But to the extent that you
demonstrated that Congress is fully supportive of his using all
of the powers that are available to him to carry out the
mandate that has been put before the international community,
and for a failure to respond on the part of Iran, we would
support that--or I would support that. Again, this specific
question does not come to the full Bipartisan Policy Center or
to the task force, so I am speaking only for myself. But I
would be supportive of anything that gives evidence of support.
Because, at this point, the credibility of the United
States is the most important factor that is being questioned.
There is no question, I don't think, in the minds of the
Iranian Government or the international community that the
United States has the capability to inflict serious damage. No
one is suggesting that they can wipe out the program all
together, but they can certainly inflict serious damage which
would slow it down and would cause very significant actions and
reactions to occur.
But the question is whether or not the United States would,
in fact, initiate such action. And that is one of the reasons
that we have placed so much emphasis, from the very beginning,
on credible, visible preparation to indicate not only an
ability but a willingness.
And if we fail to follow through with respect to our
credibility in this area, any attempt we might make to resolve
other questions in this area or around the world, all of our
treaty obligations, all of our understandings with allies on
both ends of this particular question would immediately be
subject to intense scrutiny and doubt, which would, in our
judgment, cause the governments involved to believe that they
had no choice because of the uncertainty as to whether or not
the United States would actually fulfill the threat that is
implicit, certainly, in everything that has been said,
particularly about nothing is taken from the table or there are
red lines and whatever.
But if there is assurance on the part of those who depend
on this guarantee that we will, in fact, follow through, I
think the likelihood that you will see proliferation extend to
other areas goes down, the likelihood that Iran will actually
challenge to this point goes down, and the likelihood for a
peaceful resolution goes up.
So sometimes the best preparation combined with the
demonstrated willingness to follow through is sufficient to
keep a conflict, a kinetic exchange of some sort from occurring
in the first place. And it certainly would be our hope. We are
not advocating war. We are advocating a peaceful resolution to
the question. But the only way you can be credible is to
indicate that you are not simply talking about some of these
consequences but that you are prepared and willing to follow
through.
Mr. Albright. Yeah, I would like to take a different point
of view. I think it is premature.
And I mentioned that this policy that is developing is a
knife's edge. And I think one of the ways you can fall off is
that it starts to look like the United States will attack Iran,
or at least that Iran will perceive that. And what it will do,
I would predict, is start to build--or make a decision of how
it is going to secretly build nuclear weapons.
And, again, Iran is very patient. It may not do it this
year; it may not even do it next year. But you may be faced
with an adversary that is going to get nuclear weapons before
you can attack, or the United States can attack, and it assumes
it is going to happen. And so you create an inevitability about
an Iranian nuclear weapon that is not in our interest.
And I think the other part of it is, I think, frankly,
looking back, it was a mistake for Congress to give the
authorization to President Bush about the Iraq war so early in
the debate, that Congress lost its valuable oversight on a
critical question that, I think we would all agree, has been a
very difficult process. And so I think Congress should not give
away anything that has to do with having oversight over this
process.
Now, I would also agree with Senator Robb that, because of
the nature of the policy President Obama is sculpting, it is
very hard to predict when a war would happen or a military
strike would happen, because it depends fundamentally on
Iranian actions, in the sense that he said he would ``prevent''
Iran. That means that Iran has to make a step to get nuclear
weapons and then there is a reaction. So I think the President
needs quite a bit of leeway on this, but with extensive
oversight by Congress.
The Chairman. It just seems to me that if Iran's sole
interest was just to develop nuclear capability for a power
plant or some other such source, they would not have to bury
under a mountain their facilities to avoid the possibility of
an attack. It just--it stretches, I think, credibility on their
part.
And while I am not advocating that we move forward on a
resolution of this nature, it seems that it would be good to
show that we are acting as one, that we do support the
President. Because this should not be politicized in any way,
and it should be something that we do in a bipartisan way. And
people understand that the House is under Republican leadership
while the President is a Democrat, and we should not be
separating the parties.
And, like I say, I am not at any point advocating; I am
just trying to get your impressions on this. So thank you.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple quick comments on that and then one or two
questions.
I think Mr. Albright does point out, it is a delicate
balance to strike. I mean, if Iran thinks we are coming at them
no matter what, then they better be as strong as possible, and
you have to strike that balance.
I also think that what is really interesting about this
situation is, I don't think Iran has decided yet. I think the
chairman is right. I mean, certainly there is a big part of
them that is thinking, ``We better be in a position to get a
nuclear weapon,'' and that is why all the cautious steps have
been taken, the underground bunkers and all that. But I think
all the evidence we have seen is they have not decided at this
point to step over that line.
And, you know, regardless of what they are developing it
for, you know, they have cause to be concerned that we might
attack them anyway. So I guess, I don't think that the fact
that they buried it that deep means that they are 100 percent
decided they are building a nuclear weapon. That is all I would
say about that.
The two questions I have, one for Mr. Rademaker. You had
commented when we were talking about how quickly Iran could get
there if they decided to basically make the dash for the finish
line, and we went through all of the different numbers on that,
but then you said something interesting. You said, it doesn't
make much sense for Iran to proceed in that manner. It doesn't
make sense for them to actually take the steps that would get
us on that 60-day or 105-day or 4 months or 8 days after that.
Why do you say that? Why do you say that doesn't make much
sense for them to proceed in that manner?
Mr. Rademaker. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
First, let me comment about, sort of, this larger question
of secret facilities and underground facilities. I think the
first point we have to bear in mind is Iran has a long history
of proceeding with secret underground facilities. The Natanz
facility was originally a secret facility that was revealed
against their wishes in 2002. The Fordow facility, which is a
much more--and Natanz is an underground, secure bunker, but it
is probably at risk to bunker-buster munitions. Subsequently,
they constructed a much more secure, more deeply buried
underground facility at Fordow. And, again, that was a secret
facility which was revealed contrary to their wishes.
And so the notion that--I am responding here to Mr.
Albright--but the notion that they might respond to the threat
of U.S. military force by building secret underground
facilities, you know, I think there is reason to think, based
on past behavior, that they are already planning to do that and
may already have started doing it.
Mr. Smith. I don't think that was Mr. Albright's larger
point, but----
Mr. Rademaker. Well, I think the point was that--well, one
of his points was, we don't think--I think he was saying we
don't think they have a secret facility because we don't know
of any secret facilities. And I guess I would point out that is
something of a tautology because, of course, if we knew about
it, it wouldn't be a secret facility. And given their track
record, I think there is a considerable risk that----
Mr. Smith. I have a question on that, actually, but if we
could get back for the moment to the question----
Mr. Rademaker. Okay. The--but I would--and this goes to the
first part of your question. You say you don't think they have
made a decision to go forward or not. I think it depends on
what it is we are talking about. If we mean, or if you mean you
don't think they have made a decision to actually produce a
nuclear weapon, I think----
Mr. Smith. Well----
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. I think that is true. It is
unclear whether they have made that decision. But I think----
Mr. Smith. That is my only point.
Mr. Rademaker. Well, but at the Bipartisan Policy Center,
we have always been focused at least as much on the question of
nuclear weapons capability. And there I think it is crystal-
clear, given the construction of these very expensive
underground facilities----
Mr. Smith. Oh, yes. They want to----
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. That they made a decision a
long time ago to create a nuclear weapons capability. They want
us and the rest of the countries in their region to be
profoundly fearful that they either have a weapon or are
extremely close to having one. And, therefore, they want to be
treated as a nuclear weapons state. I mean, that is the point
of achieving nuclear weapons capability: to create ambiguity
about whether and when they will actually produce a weapon, and
thereby be treated as----
Mr. Smith. Up to a point.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. Because of that doubt, to be
treated as if they had one.
Mr. Smith. If I may, up to a point. But they also don't
want to put themselves in a position where they a treated like
a pariah state for no particular gain; that they wind up being
under the threat of, you know, massive sanctions or potentially
military action.
But, again, if we could meander back to my question----
Mr. Rademaker. Okay. On that, I think they have actually
put themselves in the position of being treated as a pariah----
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. State. And they continually
make the decision to stay in that position rather than----
Mr. Smith. At the moment, yes.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. Satisfy the Security Council.
Mr. Smith. My question is, you said that you didn't think
it would make sense for Iran to walk down that step to get to
that 4-month point at this stage.
Mr. Rademaker. Yeah. On that----
Mr. Smith. Why?
Mr. Rademaker. On that, my reasons are pretty much the ones
that were articulated by Mr. Albright. These are theoretical
calculations about what they could do, but why would any
country want to make a mad dash to have one nuclear weapon?
Most countries that produce a nuclear weapon--take North
Korea--at some point they want to demonstrate to the world that
they have it----
Mr. Smith. Right. Exactly.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. And the way you demonstrate it
is by testing.
Mr. Smith. You blow it up and you----
Mr. Rademaker. So, to make a mad dash to produce one weapon
that then people will say doesn't actually work, and to show
that it works, they will want to test it----
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. You know, they haven't really
done very much.
Mr. Smith. So walking down that particular math problem,
how long would it take--because, theoretically, I mean, if you
want to declare yourself as a nuclear power, you are going to
need more than one. You are probably going to need more than
two. You are going to need to demonstrate one and then say we
have a stockpile of, I don't know, four, five, something like
that.
How long would it take for them to get to the point where--
to that point. And then I guess the second piece of that
question is, how much would we know about how far they are
walking down this road?
I mean, and that gets us to the secret issue. I mean, the
big issue--and then to sort of bounce back to this--is, will we
know when they have stepped over a line and they are trying to
build a bomb? And I have heard testimony in a variety of
different forums that we are pretty confident that we would.
Nothing is 100 percent, but that the effort that it would take
to spin up the plutonium to get to 90 percent or whatever it is
that you need to get to the weapons-grade, we are pretty
confident that we would know.
What is your take on that? And then work back from that to,
sort of, the math of how long it would take them to get to a
reasonable point.
Mr. Rademaker. We have thrown a lot of numbers out. For
your question, perhaps the most important number is one we
haven't dwelt on up to this point, and that is the amount of
low-enriched uranium that they currently have. How many bombs
could they produce from that low-enriched uranium if they
wished to do so? And David Albright's calculations on that are
that they today have five bombs' worth.
Mr. Smith. You mentioned that, two to five.
Mr. Rademaker. And our calculations are actually more
conservative, based on different methodology. But--and then the
further point is that, at current production rates, they are
producing more than a bomb's worth of low-enriched uranium
every year, so----
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Rademaker. And the rate of production is increasing. It
increased 37 percent in the last 3 months, as compared to the
previous 3 months. So, you know, all of the numbers we have
thrown out, had we been here 6 months ago or a year ago, would
have been less troubling.
Mr. Smith. So, reasonably----
Mr. Rademaker. And I would predict that if we are going to
be here 6 months or a year from now, they will be more
troubling still.
Mr. Smith. Right. So, reasonably, they are not that far
away from being in a position to make a mad dash to five or
six, is a fair thing to say.
So if they were to make that mad dash, again, the real
question is, would we know? And how much--well, I guess the
other question is, how much longer would it take them to make
five to six than it would to make one?
Mr. Rademaker. Well, this is why the question of a secret
facility becomes so important, because our ability to detect it
of course depends on there not being a secret facility at which
they are doing this. And, you know, I think the main reason
that experts will come to you and say we are pretty confident
they don't have a secret facility is that the last two times
that they tried to build a secret facility----
Mr. Smith. We knew.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. They got caught.
Mr. Smith. Yeah.
Mr. Rademaker. And so we surmise from that that they are
not very good at keeping that secret and we will catch them if
they do it again. I hope that is true.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. It is also worth pointing out--and then I
will close on this; I want to throw it to other people--it is
worth pointing out, we actually knew that they had those secret
facilities before, quite a bit before, we told everyone that we
knew, without getting into it. So, you know, there is some
confidence that we can, in fact, figure it out. But it is a
very thorny policy problem.
I am sorry, I am taking too much time. I will yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here today.
And for Senator Robb, a question that I have: What do you
believe is the current pace of Iran's nuclear weapons program?
Do you believe that the Iranians have decided to build a
nuclear weapon? Are the Iranians building a breakout capability
to allow for the option to build a weapon in the future? When
might the Iranians actually possess a nuclear weapon? Could the
Iranians accelerate their efforts? And if so, to what degree?
Mr. Robb. I think that a large part of the series of
questions that you just asked have just been discussed at some
length by the two technical experts here.
We don't know in absolute terms how fast it is producing.
And each of our reports have indicated that there were--the
estimates, both in terms of technical capability, speed of
production, and our understanding of the amount of HEU [highly-
enriched uranium] or other material, was not certain. But, as
Mr. Rademaker just indicated, we believe and hope that we will
have enough information so that we would recognize it in a
relatively short period of time. And because we have discovered
previous efforts to construct underground facilities and they
have been discovered, we don't think that they can go on for an
unlimited period of time with a very significant increase in
production.
But it all ultimately boils down to how much HEU they are
able to refine so that they could make a weapon or weapons. And
that is probably never going to be knowable in an absolute
sense unless we do it through some technical means that we
obviously wouldn't be discussing. So we are going to have to be
prepared for the worst case.
One of the elements of this equation that has not been
dwelt upon this morning to any extent is, what does the Israeli
Government think about the situation, how might they react, and
is their calculation as to how much time, how much fissile
material, how close to breakout they might be the same as ours?
And the ultimate question, even, is whether they would share
their estimate and/or their decision to intervene. They have
made it clear that they see this as an existential threat and
take that very seriously.
And much of our effort has been designed to try to make it
possible to show the folks, the leadership in Tehran that both
the United States and Israel, if they believe they reach
whatever point represents in their judgment the crossing of a
red line, that they have the capability, more so on the Israeli
side and will more so on the U.S. side.
I don't know if I covered all of your questions, but----
Mr. Wilson. Well, you did. And I appreciate, actually, you
raising Israel's estimation and, indeed, the threat to their
existence. So thank you for raising that.
Mr. Rademaker, a question: Apart from the ability to
conduct a military strike to delay or end Iran's nuclear
weapons program, what other benefits result from enhancing the
credibility of the military option? For example, do we know how
Iran would view increased military readiness? Would it enhance
our diplomatic efforts? How would our regional allies respond?
Mr. Rademaker. Those are very interesting questions.
The first point I would make is that our recommendations,
the Bipartisan Policy Center recommendations, are not a call to
war with Iran. We are not calling for a military strike. We are
calling for credible indications that force is in prospect.
You know, President Obama and President Bush before him
both used this term, that ``all options are on the table.'' And
by that, they mean to imply that the threat of military force
is also on the table. Our concern is that we don't think the
Iranians actually believe that. And for every time that
President Obama has said, ``All options are on the table,''
there has been a statement by some other senior Cabinet
official or some other official of the United States Government
suggesting that the military option really isn't a very serious
option for the United States. And we worry, our task force
worries that Iranians actually pay more attention to those
signs of equivocation than they do to the mouthing of these
words, that all options are on the table. So our call has been
to make that statement by both President Obama and President
Bush more credible.
And we believe that if it becomes more credible, if the
Iranians believe that continued pursuit by them of a nuclear
weapon, continued defiance by them of the legally binding
demands of the U.N. Security Council will ultimately lead to
the use of force against them unless they come to a diplomatic
resolution of the crisis, that that will increase the
likelihood that we will actually achieve a peaceful, diplomatic
resolution, which is what I think all of us believe would be
the best solution to this problem.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
I am going to throw a question out, and whoever wants to
respond. We have talked about the Iranians and what they may
do. I am curious as to what your opinion is of who ``they''
are. We know President Ahmadinejad, we know what he talks, but
what is the true power base in Iran? Where would these
decisions that we are talking about need to be made? And how
much chance is there that these kind of things we are talking
about can influence that power base?
Mr. Robb. Well, even though most of the attention is
focused on either the--and I am suddenly forgetting his title--
in any event, Ahmadinejad, it is the Revolutionary Guard that
holds the power. And they are stationed at Qom and will
ultimately dictate what takes place.
The public face is on--what am I thinking?--comity.
Ahmadinejad has no real power, and of course he is going to be
going out of office before too long in any event. But he has
always been the most outspoken and has had the most provacative
language, but he doesn't really have the power.
But there is a general consensus that whatever power
structure might evolve after that is still going to want to
find a way to become credible as a member of the nuclear club,
so to speak. And it doesn't necessarily mean that they have
actually built or even formally tested. As long as the
international community believes that they have the ability
within some short period of time to achieve breakout, they will
probably get almost as much as they would get from actually
testing or certainly from launching a nuclear warhead.
At this point, it is a matter for--the real struggle in the
eyes of most of the leadership in Tehran and Qom and elsewhere
is to become a member of this club and use the influence that
that would gain. They look at what happens to those other
powers in the general vicinity that have achieved nuclear
status and believe that they can achieve that, as well. It is--
--
Mr. Kissell. But, ultimately, how consolidated is that
decisionmaking base? Is it just there in the Revolutionary
Guard within just a very few people? How consolidated or how
broad is that base of decisionmaking?
Mr. Albright. Could I add to this?
Mr. Kissell. Yes.
Mr. Albright. I mean, ultimately, the supreme leader
decides, and he is very tough to deal with.
Mr. Kissell. Yes.
Mr. Albright. But I would answer it a little differently.
Because, again, I don't see a consolidated base in Iran on
building nuclear weapons, making the decision to do so. I see a
consolidated--or, a near consensus that they want the
capability to do it.
But I think they can be effective. And I think if you look
at what happened in 2003, the U.S. intelligence community says
the nuclear weaponization program was shut down. The
International Atomic Energy Agency, in its November 2011
report, said there was an abrupt halt to a great deal of
nuclear weaponization activities. There was a suspension in
their enrichment program. That was due to pressure. They
understood that, and they stopped to avoid worse consequences.
I would argue that Fordow--and, again, this is an
assessment based on our collection of evidence--that Fordow was
probably being designed to make weapon-grade uranium. We can't
prove it. The information that supports that is mainly right
now from two sources; one is some past behavior of Iranian
entities that were creating a parallel military nuclear program
in the 1990's, and then what the IAEA inspectors observed when
they went into that plant soon after they were allowed to do.
But the detection of that plant stopped them cold. They
rapidly--they removed piping from one whole hall----
Mr. Kissell. And I am going to interrupt you just one
second. My time is running out.
Mr. Albright. Okay, sorry.
Mr. Kissell. I guess the point I want to make is, the folks
that we are targeting and trying to get them to make a decision
to back away from this, how flexible, how much can we influence
them? You know, who are those folks, and just, you know, how
much can we influence them?
Mr. Albright. Well, I think we can. There are two things--
--
Mr. Kissell. And my time is out. You answered my question.
Thank you.
Mr. Albright. There are two parts to that. One is, can you
effect them to make concessions in negotiations? That is a very
tough problem. The other is----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Albright. Oh, does that mean I should be quiet? I am
sorry. I am not used to some of these rules.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you
for holding this hearing. I think it is a crucial hearing for
us to have. And thank you for your leadership on that.
And to each of you three gentlemen, I have enormous
respect, and I just appreciate you sharing your ideas with us
today. I am going to direct my question to Senator Robb because
he was my Governor and my Senator, but I would love to have any
of your responses there.
Senator, you have stated in your testimony that you believe
that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is the most urgent
national security threat facing the United States. I don't
disagree with that at all. And then also you talked about the
need for us to have evidence-based issues. It is not enough
just to talk about it; we have to show we have the resolve to
do something. And then another line that I thought was very
important was when you said, ``It is only the credible threat
of force combined with sanctions that affords any realistic
hope of an acceptable diplomatic resolution.''
And here is my question. As we realize that--and I think
all of us would concur with those statements, and I think the
three of you on the panel would do that--what kind of conflict
do we have in sending that message of a credible threat of
force when Iran is watching us with these huge defense cuts
that we are doing, $487 billion and then sequestration looming
out there, which certainly sends a message to the world that we
may not have that kind of credible force.
We then look at another statement that you made which
talked about beefing up the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf and
the Gulf of Oman. How does that conflict with the new strategy
of this pivot to the Asia-Pacific area? We can't have it, kind
of, both ways.
The third thing you talked about, and I agree with you 100
percent, prepositioning military supplies. And yet we are
moving our prepositioned stocks back out of the Pacific and the
Asia area.
And then you talked about the need to strengthen the Air
Force capabilities to require an effective strike. But General
Breedlove has testified that the Air Force now is on the ragged
edge, and, with these cuts, we are not going to get any better.
So I would love to have the assessment from the three of
you on if you think they have any impact on our credible force.
And then if you have time, also, we see yet today another
leak out of the White House of stuff we are doing in Iran. How
detrimental is that in what we are doing?
Senator, I would love to have your thoughts on those.
Mr. Robb. Well, first of all, leaks of sensitive
intelligence information don't help the United States in any
way, shape, or form. And we ought to do everything within our
power--again, I am not excepting the necessary attribution in
terms of who leaked or how, but leaks of sensitive information
about capabilities, about plans, about other activities that
might be under consideration ought to be avoided at all cost. I
will just leave it at that.
The other question about our capability being eroded by the
defense cuts and the sequestration and whatever, there is no
question that those present enormous challenges to our United
States military forces in each of the areas that you have
outlined. And that is one of the reasons why it is especially
important right now that we not appear to relax our apparent
guard or our apparent willingness to follow through with that
particular, I will use the word ``threat'' in the event of an
action which is simply unacceptable.
And, incidentally, we argued 4 years ago, in beginning
this, between ``untenable'' and ``unacceptable.'' We had 1
whole day of discussing which word to use. And we used
``untenable'' because we didn't want to imply a red line at
that point in the process that would require the United States
to either take military action or lose credibility.
But both administrations--and that was done before the last
election, so we didn't know which administration was going to
be following up on this action--but both administrations have
used the word ``unacceptable,'' and senior representatives of
those services.
So when you use that word, as far as I am concerned your
credibility is now at stake. And it is that much more important
that we use our commitments wisely. We may have to--and we make
some reference in the paper--divert some current military
assets to strengthen our ability to respond in this particular
area, but that is not an attractive option by----
Mr. Forbes. My time is up, but thank you. And we would love
to have any response that you have for the record so that we
could use that. It would be wonderful. And thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Albright, do you believe with the statement of the
Bipartisan Policy Center that we are calling for a triple-track
strategy? And if you do, what is your opinion of the credible
preparedness of the military option, which Mr. Rademaker says
has fallen short?
Mr. Albright. I haven't studied it in detail. I mean, you
are outlining three ways forward that I think most who are
worried about Iran's nuclear program would agree with. I mean--
--
The Chairman. Mr. Albright, could you please talk into the
microphone?
Mr. Albright. Oh, okay.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Albright. I think that there is--I have broad agreement
with the three areas. I mean, where I think there may be a
problem is overemphasizing the military. I will repeat what I
said earlier, that you run a real risk that Iran thinks that we
intend to attack them regardless, and that that can have some
very negative consequences.
Ms. Hanabusa. Would I be correct in assuming that your
analysis is that if we do what Mr. Rademaker is saying is that
we have fallen short and we begin to enhance that, that your
belief is that Iran would then interpret it as an offensive
action and then do this breakout? More probability?
Mr. Albright. Or pursue a secret route.
Ms. Hanabusa. And you feel that that would be almost the
unintended consequence of what is being proposed.
Mr. Albright. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Now, Mr. Rademaker or Senator Robb, I see and
what your position is is that we have fallen short in terms of
the military option.
And I think, Senator, in your written testimony you have
spoken to building the Fifth Fleet. And I am just--I am trying
to understand, when you want to enhance the Fifth Fleet, what
does that exactly look like?
Mr. Robb. Well, with the exception of specifying what
munitions that we ought to sell to Israel to shore up their
capability, we have not tried to specify how many warships, how
many aircraft, how many whatever the case may be in this
particular case. The objective of the Bipartisan Policy Center
is not to create an entire punch list for the Government to
check off. We think that ought to come from the military
commanders in the area, in consultation with the civilian
leadership.
What we are suggesting is that these are areas that can and
ought to be shored up so that we make more credible and give
greater emphasis to our willingness to follow through in the
event that Iran does not take our threat--again I use that
word--seriously.
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand that, Senator. And I guess what
I hear is that--and what I read was that it is sort of a joint
effort. In other words, if we are not, the United States is not
willing to provide whatever enhancement or security that Israel
may need, that we then have an obligation--or if we want to
prevent this buildup, we then should then focus on our own
presence, in terms of the building up of the Fifth Fleet.
But I still assume that to make the analysis that we have
fallen short or it is somehow inadequate, there must be some
measurement in your mind that we are not reaching. And I am
just trying to get an understanding of what that level is that
leads to the conclusion by Mr. Rademaker in his testimony that
we have fallen short.
How have we fallen short? I mean, without getting into that
we need another carrier or we need whatever or we need to give
Israel X, Y, and Z, why do you think conclude that we have
fallen short?
Mr. Rademaker. Let me make a threshold point here, which
is--and some of the others witnesses have referred to this. The
last time that Iran perceived a credible threat that military
force was going to be used against them, they suspended uranium
enrichment. That was right after the Iraq war in 2003. And not
coincidentally, Libya did the same thing. Qadhafi gave up his
nuclear weapons program at the same time.
Because in that initial 6- to, you know, 12-month period
after the U.S. went into Iraq, the threat to--you know,
President Bush had given his ``axis of evil'' speech. The
perception in Tehran, we believe, was that what had just been
done to Iraq might happen to them, and they were genuinely
worried about it. And one of the things they did was they
suspended uranium enrichment and engaged in a fairly serious,
fairly intensive diplomatic process with the Europeans.
And, of course, we all know what happened next. The Iraq
war headed south, and the U.S. became bogged down and----
Ms. Hanabusa. I am out of time. Could you put that in
writing, what you were going to finish with that statement all
the way through to the--Mr. Chair, if that is okay--with the
final assessment of how we have fallen short?
Mr. Rademaker. I think I can finish in one sentence.
Once they stopped believing that there was a serious risk
that the U.S. would conduct military activities against them
because of the way this was playing out in Iraq, they ended
their suspension of enrichment and have never returned to it
and have persisted with their nuclear program ever since.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our panelists for their dedication and
commitment to trying to provide some overall description and
understanding on a bipartisan basis on what really is an
important issue.
I want to underscore, though, that I am very concerned
about how the tenor of the hearing and the message of the
hearing has gone if someone had only been watching this
hearing. So I want to sort of backtrack and reverse a little
bit on what our topic has been.
Because there have been a lot of statements that we have
had, both from Members and on the panelists, of things like,
you know, ``Well, we think they will stop, it doesn't make much
sense for them to proceed''--a lot of statements that I think
would lead one to believe that we don't really have to do
anything and we are not going to be facing a nuclear Iran.
So I want to backtrack a bit on this whole issue because of
two things: One, I think it would be incredibly naive for
anybody to believe that we need to do nothing--and I don't
believe our panelists believe that--to avoid a nuclear Iran.
I recall, and I am certain you all do, the discussions
during North Korea's pursuit for nuclear weapons, that it
wasn't just enrichment, it was nuclear weapons, and their
pursuit currently for ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
technology that, as you know, our Secretary--former Secretary
Gates said is an absolute threat to the mainland of the United
States. And I recall the people who said North Korea would
never go as far as to have nuclear weapons capability, they
would never have a test, they would never have a weapon, that
they were starving their people, that the outcry of the
international community would have such a great effect that
North Korea would not be a nuclear weapons state. Today they
are.
So those statements, that thought process of ``surely, a
nation wouldn't, because the price is just too great'' has been
proven, with the most recent pursuit by North Korea, as not to
be sufficient to deter someone from doing that.
Military action, as you have just mentioned, Mr.
Rademaker--and I know that Mr. Albright mentioned that the
National Intelligence Assessment of 2003 indicated a belief--
again, it was just a belief--that the nuclear weapon that was
suspended by Iran in 2003 was, as you were just describing, Mr.
Rademaker, a basis of the action that Iraq had been invaded and
they had a military sitting next to them and that the threat of
credible force caused them to suspend.
But the reason why I wanted to back up, besides just the
issue of North Korea, is to put in context as to why we really
care. Iran is not Canada. Iran is a terrorist-supporting
nation, regime, both through Hamas and Hezbollah. They have
made aggressive statements against Israel and the United
States. They have continued to make threatening statements or
gestures with respect to the Straits of Hormuz, which would
have significant world impact if they were to take any action
there.
So the issues that we are talking about here are very
serious and not ones which we should just say that we have a
belief that it would not make much sense for them to proceed.
Because I would venture to say, and I think everybody in this
room would individually agree, no one, not one person in this
room can ever say what another nation thinks or is going to do.
We can only do an assessment of what we have studied and, from
that, what we can ascertain.
But I think the purpose of this hearing is the to-do list
for avoiding that, right? I mean, it is not for us to just
conclude, we don't have to worry about this. It is, what do we
need to do?
And I was very pleased with the Washington Post editorial
today. The Washington Post editorial says an impasse with
Iran--which is why this is so important we are doing it; it is
even the lead editorial. And it says--it concludes with,
``Israel may press for military action,'' but it goes on to
say--it concludes, ``If that option is to be resisted, there
must be a credible and robust alternative.'' And that is that
issue of the to-do list. What do we have to do to make certain
that they are deterred so that they don't have to just merely
be impacted by military action?
Now, back to this issue of what they are doing. We can't
say what they are thinking. We can only say what they are doing
in order to ascertain this to-do list. I am the chairman of
Strategic Forces, and I know that--and I know the panelists
know that Iran is pursuing vigorously missile technology.
In the missile technology that they are pursuing, certainly
it would lend itself to a belief that there are capabilities
that they are seeking of ICBM. If they were to seek ICBM
capability, wouldn't be that be an indication that they are
seeking a nuclear weapons program? Because you can't have an
ICBM that is just conventional for their program.
Could you just talk for a moment about what we see them
actually doing, not what we believe that they are doing, and
how that goes directly to the imperative action that we take on
our to-do list?
Mr. Albright. Let me say something.
I mean, I think they are trying to develop nuclear weapons.
I mean, I see them on a trajectory to get nuclear weapons----
Mr. Albright. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Albright. But let me--oh, I am sorry.
The Chairman. What I would like you to do is put it for the
record, please. Because there really isn't--he used his whole
time.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I think the answer we got, though,
was pretty important, is that you do believe that they are
seeking nuclear weapons. And so, if we could get the answers
for the record----
Mr. Albright. On a trajectory.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. That would be really helpful.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you gentlemen for being here today.
I understand that the organization is bipartisan, no
question about that. It is bipartisan in terms of the
politicians who founded it and those who speak for it, that is
true. And whenever you have politics--and whenever you have
politicians, you have politics. And I love politics. I am a
politician myself. But I understand how it works.
I am really skeptical about the timing of this report. It
seems that it could have some effect in the upcoming political
races around the country. And, you know, it really appears to
me to have parallels with the run-up toward the invasion of
Iraq, which, by the way, was they say now based on faulty
intelligence, the decision to go in, based on faulty
intelligence.
What I am wondering is whether or not--or, really, what I
am wondering is, what level of intelligence was used in coming
to your conclusions in this report?
Either Mr. Robb or Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Robb. Well, let me first of all say that I had a little
something to do with examining the intelligence that led to the
invasion in Iraq. Judge Silberman and I co-chaired the WMD
[weapons of mass destruction] commission that explored the
intelligence community in detail.
This report, however, is not based on any classified
information. It is based solely on open-source information,
matters that have been reported, and, more importantly, on the
expertise of the people who make up the various task forces. In
this particular case, we have people who are very
knowledgeable.
Certainly, you have politicians in addition to many other
subject-matter experts and others who have something to
contribute in a significant way. But to suggest that this was
done for an election or whatever, I am showing you, three out
of the four reports that preceded the last Presidential
election, they have continued throughout. We have updated some
of the information as it has become available.
Mr. Johnson. Well, now, I am not accusing the----
Mr. Robb. I just wanted to assure----
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Organization of playing politics.
I did not mean to do that, and I am sorry if I----
Mr. Robb. No, I just wanted to make sure that there wasn't
any perception----
Mr. Johnson. Uh-huh.
Mr. Robb [continuing]. On the part of anyone. But I accept
your----
Mr. Johnson. But, you know, I mean--and I came into this
with healthy skepticism because I do not want to see us proceed
along a drumming--a tightening, you know, a louder drumming
toward war. And I know that one of the things that you all talk
about is the fact that, you know, diplomacy is not working and
so, therefore, we need to start rattling the sword, the sabres,
and we need to start showing more military preparation. And we
already have substantial military assets that have been
ratcheted up and are in place in the region, ready to strike if
need be.
These things are kind of--so when we start saying that
diplomacy has failed--and, really, the Moscow talks right now
are not--they have not failed. They are still discussing
things. But it seems like you all are ratcheting up the
pressure to force the President to make a move that even he
with his military advisors and superior intelligence assets do
not think is important right now.
And this comes after the President has imposed sanctions
that are unprecedented against Iran. Is that true?
Mr. Robb. We give the President full credit for what he has
done, for his negotiations, for his diplomacy, for his increase
in sanctions.
What we are saying is, the bottom line is this hasn't yet
proven to be enough. While these discussions and negotiations
have taken place, there has been no evidence that Iran is
prepared to make any kind of good-faith effort to resolve this
question. But they have continued to keep the centrifuges
running. They have continued to increase their ability----
Mr. Johnson. Do they have a right to produce nuclear
energy?
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. This would be a question for the entire panel.
Could you please provide some more specifics about America's
military capability that need to be enhanced and the benefit of
increasing the United States Fifth Fleet presence in the region
in order to address the Iranian problem?
Mr. Robb. I am sorry, I am just consulting because the
question was so fast that I couldn't pick it all up. But if the
question is, do we believe that additional steps need to be
taken in the course of this ongoing negotiation, the answer
would be yes.
Mr. Brooks. No, no, I am talking about America's military
capability. I will reread the question, and I will go slower.
Could you provide some more specifics about America's
military capabilities that need to be enhanced and the benefit
of increasing the United States Fifth Fleet's presence in the
region?
Mr. Rademaker. Congressman, one of the contributions of the
Bipartisan Policy Center to this debate was the publication of
a paper that I think addresses that very question. So perhaps
what we should do is submit that paper for the record, because
it goes through in a more detailed fashion, outlining some of
those steps.
Mr. Brooks. If you would do that, that would be
appreciated.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 86.]
Mr. Brooks. And do any of you have a judgment as to how
sequestration, which currently is scheduled to take effect on
January 1st of 2013, will affect the needed military
capabilities to address the Iranian issue, if we get to that
point?
Mr. Robb. Well, I think we have indicated that it will make
it much more difficult. There is no question about that. And--
--
Mr. Brooks. Is there some way you can quantify what you
mean when you say ``much more difficult''?
Mr. Robb. Well, we have attempted to do that in the papers
that we have discussed, although because sequestration was not
an issue earlier on, it is not addressed in a straightforward
way. But there is no question that you can't cut down
significantly in all of the elements of force that are
necessary to carry out our responsibilities in this area and
elsewhere around the world without severe strain.
When you start talking about taking 80,000 troops in the
Army and the Marine Corps, or taking the level down by that
much, you are making a significant reduction in your capability
and your ability to rotate, et cetera. To the extent that you
cancel weapons systems or reduce the number of individual
weapons that you buy or other units that you buy, you are
clearly putting additional stress.
Almost everything that Congress does, that the President
does has to do with tradeoffs and choices. And what we are
doing is pointing out that we can't let those kinds of
challenges completely undermine our ability to thwart what
could be a far more disastrous consequence if Iran were to
achieve the nuclear weapons capability which they seek and we
are unable to provide credible evidence of our ability to
follow up on what we say we are going to do.
So, sure, it is a tremendous challenge that we face. But we
can't, simply because we have a significant possibility of
serious reductions in many areas, abandon the need for eternal
vigilance in this area.
Mr. Brooks. Let me make a statement, then I would like your
reaction to it. If you agree with it, that is fine. If you
disagree with it, that is fine. But you have greater insight
than I do, so it would be beneficial for the record to have
your reaction.
If sequestration takes effect, that is going to adversely
affect our military. We have had some judgments in the
neighborhood of 700,000 fewer uniformed personnel, DOD
[Department of Defense], civilian support workers, private-
sector and military support personnel.
Right now our military capability has a twofold positive in
this issue. One is it creates a credible deterrent. We have the
military capability in the eyes of the Iranians, so they have
to consider that. Second, if the Iranians actually get to the
point of developing nuclear weapons and it is in the United
States' interest to stop that development, we have the
capability to succeed in stopping Iranian acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
However, if sequestration goes into effect, then we have
decreased our capability and decreased our deterrence and, in
fact, have actually increased the probability that Iran will be
able to acquire nuclear weapons and use them as they wish. What
is your reaction to that?
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. If you
could please answer that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
Mr. Rademaker. I think we agree.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mr. Albright. Maybe not completely.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here on a serious
topic.
I appreciate the fact that my colleague is asking the
question, but I think we have to put that in a context--this
isn't the place to necessarily do that--in terms of how we face
the challenges that we see, whether it is in the military or
whether it is in other aspects of our economy and, certainly,
of the services that our people anticipate and know that exist
here in this country.
I wanted to go back to the discussion of the Fifth Fleet
and whether or not we would need to preposition additional
resources from CENTCOM [Central Command] in that area. I think
I was hearing that you thought that would be a good thing. And
that raises the question of whether or not you feel that we
have sufficient resources to surge forces in the area if we
needed them, or you felt that we needed to bring those
resources into the area today or, you know, down the line and
take them away from other areas where I think that the Pentagon
has decided those resources really need to be.
Are you suggesting a prepositioning, or are you suggesting
at some point that might be something that we need to look at?
Mr. Robb. I think most of that question was answered in
response to a previous question, but what we are trying to do
is to illuminate some of the things that the United States can
do to increase its ability and credibility to respond if
necessary. And there are always going to be some tradeoffs. We
are not trying to proscribe that you put two more DDGs [guided
missile destroyers], X number of whatever in a particular area.
We are saying, these are things you can do to make the argument
that we are making more credible.
And the credibility, if it doesn't have evidence of
capability, is not going to be increased.
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Are you suggesting, though, that that
would be an additional deterrence? Does Iran really need more
from us that would suggest that we need to have more
deterrence?
Mr. Robb. With all due respect, what we are trying to say
is that we need to be credible in our ability to use kinetic
force, if necessary, to thwart the Iranian quest to achieve
nuclear weapons capability. And that is really what it amounts
to.
And we are not suggesting that there are not very difficult
choices that are going to have to be made with respect to
weapons systems, weapons, et cetera, manpower, whatever the
case may be, but that we need to focus on creating an
understanding in the eyes particularly of the Iranians, but
also the Israelis, the rest of the neighbors, and the
international community, that if we say we are serious, we are,
in fact, serious and that we are not reducing our capability at
the same time that we are suggesting that we are serious.
Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. But you are acknowledging there is
tremendous capability in the region today.
Mr. Robb. Oh, yes, there is no question about the fact
that--there is no nation on Earth that has the kind of
capability that we have in all regions of the world.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that
because----
Mr. Robb. Okay.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. It came across a little
differently. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I think we also know that there are possibilities of Iran
having biological weapons. There are ways in which they
leverage proxy groups. Your focus today, I appreciate that, is
on the nuclear, but I wondered if you wanted to comment on
that, and Mr. Albright as well, if you wanted to say anything
regarding those issues and how important that is for us to have
that understanding as well.
Mr. Rademaker. Maybe I will just make one comment quickly
and then turn it over to David.
The question was asked earlier about the potential of an
Iranian ICBM threat and what could we confer from that. And I
don't think any of us have access to current intelligence on
what exactly Iran is doing in the missile area except we know
that they consistently sought missiles with increasingly
greater ranges.
But the question was, if they are seeking an ICBM, what can
we confer about their nuclear weapons or other WMD intentions?
And I think the answer to that is, it would make no sense for
Iran to pursue an ICBM unless they intended to mount either a
nuclear weapon or a biological weapon, potentially a chemical
weapon, but a weapon of mass destruction, because the accuracy
of their ICBMs would be such that a conventional warhead would
make no sense on that kind of weapons systems for them.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your testimony. This has been really
important today and, obviously, very timely for all of us. And
so we appreciate your time today.
Of course, it has already been mentioned that Iran
announced yesterday its plan to build a nuclear-powered
submarine. And so my question would be, based on your
information, does it have the ability to build the atomic sub?
And if so, what would be the significance both as an offensive
platform as well as its ability to disrupt the maritime traffic
in the Strait of Hormuz?
So, you know, is this--or the alternative being, is this
plan simply just refining--to justify refining uranium to
higher levels?
And all of you or any one of you can respond.
Mr. Albright. I don't think they can build a nuclear-
powered submarine. I mean, Brazil has been trying since the
1980s to do it. So I think it is more posturing on their part
to send their own types of messages. They are struggling to
build a reactor on land. To try to put one in a submarine is a
much more challenging feat.
Now, one thing--they may be trying to signal to higher
enrichment levels, but there is no need for higher enrichment
levels in a nuclear-powered submarine. I mean, the United
States uses 90-, 97-, 98-percent enriched uranium in its. The
French use low-enriched uranium. The Brazilians, if they ever
build one, are going to be using low-enriched uranium.
So one thing that certainly needs to be said is that a
nuclear-powered submarine provides no justification for
producing highly enriched uranium.
Mr. Rademaker. I would simply add to that, though, it
provides no necessary justification, but I do worry,
personally, that Iran for a long time has been seeking pretexts
to enrich to higher levels. I believe their enrichment to 20
percent is based fundamentally on a pretext that they have a
medical research reactor that requires it, and they are
producing vastly more 20-percent enriched uranium than that
reactor will ever require. And I think that is the proof that
they are proceeding on the basis of a pretext.
I think there is every reason to think that, just as we sit
among ourselves and ask how can we pressure the Iranians, let's
do more in the area of sanctions, let's do more on the military
option, in Tehran they are doing the same thing. They are
saying, okay, how do we pressure the--their strategy isn't,
okay, how do we hunker down and withstand American sanctions?
Their strategy is, what can we do to pressure them back?
Mrs. Roby. Right.
Mr. Rademaker. Enriching to 20 percent I think has proven
to be a very effective way for them to pressure us back. If
they can come up with a peaceful, that is to say non-weapons,
rationale for enriching to even higher levels than 20 percent,
that will turn the pressure up on us to even greater levels.
So the fact that American nuclear submarines use highly
enriched uranium as their fuel potentially would be all the
justification they would need if they ostensibly were embarked
on a nuclear submarine program; to say, well, they need the
same type of fuel that the Americans have, and therefore that
is why they are now enriching to 90 percent.
Now, of course, 90-percent enriched uranium also is
weapons-grade and could potentially have a non-peaceful use.
But if they are searching for justifications to do this in
order to pressure us, I worry that this----
Mrs. Roby. That would be a good one.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. Nuclear submarine--because I
agree with David. Realistically, they are decades away from
being able to do that. If they announced they have already
begun producing the fuel for it, to me, that is a very
troubling sign.
Mr. Albright. Yeah. And just to emphasize, I mean, I think
people, when we were engaged in these debates, said they would
never move to make 20-percent enriched uranium. It just isn't
conceivable.
Mrs. Roby. Right.
Mr. Albright. And so they did. So I think it is a very big
concern that they will try to find a way to make highly
enriched uranium.
And so I think the--but it raises one of the more troubling
scenarios or pathways to the bomb which really no one has an
answer to. Thank God it is slow-moving, but it really is what
we call at ISIS [Institute for Science and International
Security] in our reports ``cheating in plain sight,'' where
they will just move to--they won't even bother to break out.
They will just move to find a justification to make highly
enriched uranium----
Mrs. Roby. Right.
Mr. Albright [continuing]. First maybe, whatever, 30
percent, 50 percent, and then just try to work their way up the
ladder. And it is one of the more perplexing problems to deal
with.
Mrs. Roby. Very quickly, does Iran have the ability to
strike the United States on our own soil? And if so, how?
Mr. Albright. Well, through terrorist means.
Mrs. Roby. Well, sure.
Mr. Albright. I don't think they have a means to attack us.
Certainly, even if they developed a nuclear explosive device,
they would be a long way from being able to attack us with
that.
Mr. Rademaker. Delivery would be the problem with a nuclear
weapon. But, you know, through terrorist groups or loaded on a
ship.
Mrs. Roby. Sure.
Mr. Rademaker. But attacking us with a missile, I don't
think that is within their capability currently.
Mr. Robb. I think it is generally agreed that there is very
little likelihood that they would attempt to launch from their
own soil or in a way that could be directly attributed to them
any kind of a weapon of mass destruction to the United States.
Mrs. Roby. And that goes to whether they have the will to
do it. And my time has expired. Thank you so much.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations here today
and for your leadership.
I am one of those that would like to get an assessment on
the limited strike efforts.
Mr. Rademaker, in reading through your report, I find it
difficult to believe that a surgical strike alone would somehow
be sufficient to prevent Iran from continuing its nuclear
enrichment efforts. Do you think a surgical strike is
sufficient?
Mr. Rademaker. The military option is not a particularly
satisfying option. It affords no permanent solution to the
problem, and I think that is what your question gets at. It
would buy time.
And, you know, I think what President Obama means when he
says, ``All options are on the table,'' what he means is, if
the only way we can--if diplomacy has failed and nothing else
is working and they are about to get a nuclear weapon, then we
are going to buy time through a military strike. And I think
our recommendation is that that is right, but the problem at
the moment is the Iranians don't really believe that that
military option is available or seriously contemplated by the
United States. And so we are recommending measures to eliminate
doubts that the Iranians might have that that is a serious
option.
But I think your question gets to the issue of, through
military force alone, you know, short of an invasion, an
occupation of the country, can we be satisfied that a precise
air operation that takes out the Natanz facility, the Fordow
facility, that that will solve the Iranian nuclear problem? And
of course it won't, because Iran has an uranium-enrichment-
based program, and today they manufacture the centrifuges. They
have the blueprints, they have the manufacturing capability. So
we can destroy all the centrifuges they have, but they can make
more, they can stand them up again.
So, I mean, if you game this out, if we end up relying on
military force to solve this problem, probably we buy a year or
two, but then after that, if the program is back where it was
before, then potentially we have to use military force again.
That is why it is not anyone's preferred solution to the
problem. The preferred solution is diplomacy that achieves
suspension of Iran's enrichment capability, as the U.N.
Security Council has demanded. And that is what we all hope to
see. Our recommendation is that more be done to strengthen
sanctions, more be done to strengthen the credibility of the
military option, in hopes that collectively those kinds of
measures will increase the prospects for diplomacy to succeed.
Mr. Robb. If I might just add----
Ms. Speier. Yes, go ahead, Senator Robb.
Mr. Robb. One of the----
Ms. Speier. I have very little time, so----
Mr. Robb. Okay.
One of the objectives here is to continue to increase the
sanctions to the point that, at some point, although it is very
unlike to occur through direct negotiations, that whoever is in
charge at that particular time in Iran will come to the
conclusion that it is in our best interest to suspend an
attempt to get a nuclear weapons capability and that the
pressure that would--the political pressure inside the country
would be so great, or the other consequences that would take
place, that they would simply, instead of negotiating, would
change their course of action and that the United States could
then slow down, or if they rolled back, then the United States
could roll back sanctions.
But until that time occurs, we want to continue to increase
the pressure with sanctions to continue to tighten the noose so
that they will ultimately conclude that it is in their long-
term best interest to adopt a different course of action.
Mr. Albright. And let me just add--can I?
Ms. Speier. Please, go ahead, Mr. Albright.
Mr. Albright. There is no magic strike that is going to
solve this problem. But there is also time now to consider, you
know, if military options are being thought about, how do they
fit into an overall strategy to keep Iran from getting nuclear
weapons? And there is going to have to be something the day
after, and that is going to be an incredibly important part of
this.
There is also time to look further at how do you stop them
from getting nuclear weapons through non-military means? And I
think the leak in The Washington Post today--and, again, I am
against all leaks, but one thing it did do is it sent a signal
to Iran that, you know, you better worry, we are in all your
computers, and we can turn on your cameras and we can turn on
the microphones. And it is a signal that says, look, don't even
try something secret.
Now, again, that is an exaggerated example, but there is a
whole range of things going on----
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Albright [continuing]. That could be expanded that are
non-military, essentially.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would just like to make a couple points.
One is, Iran is the second-largest country in the Middle
East, if I am not mistaken, size-wise, geographically. And I
guess my question is, what is the minimum number of facilities
that we would strike if we went in? And how far are those
facilities apart? Is that something that can be discussed in
this forum?
Mr. Robb. I was going to say, this is not the proper----
Mr. Scott. Okay.
Mr. Robb [continuing]. Forum for a discussion of targeting.
Mr. Scott. Okay. We will leave it at that. But I do think
that the geographical size of the country leaves some question.
Mr. Robb. In a very general sense, that is one of the
reasons that we are recommend that additional KC-135s be
supplied, so that the----
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
Mr. Robb [continuing]. Credibility of the Israeli response
to crossing a red line that they have laid down would be taken
more seriously. Because you do have very significant distances,
and the ability to strike and return without refuelers is very
much in question.
Mr. Scott. Absolutely. And we as a country cannot expect
Israel to take this challenge on by themselves. We have got to
stand by them. They are our true ally over there.
I guess I say that to get to this next point. You have the
U.S., you have Britain, you have France, you have Germany, and
you have Russia and China all engaging in the talks right now
in Moscow, if I am correct. If those countries can't influence
Iran, who can have any influence on Iran?
Mr. Albright. Well, they have influence on Iran. I mean,
Iran would, I think, be much further along on nuclear weapons
if that influence hadn't been exerted. And so I think there is
a lot going on beyond the negotiations to slow them down and
deter them from breaking out. So I think a lot is going on.
Now----
Mr. Scott. We are not just trying to slow them down,
though. We are trying to stop them.
Mr. Albright. No, that is right. And that is right, and
that is the goal. Or prevent them, I mean, if they do make the
break.
But I think the expectation is that more pressure will be
applied, that sanctions--from what I understand, the U.S.
Congress is masters at developing sanctions on Iran. And I
would expect more.
Mr. Rademaker. I think, Congressman, my personal belief is
that, if all those countries you named made this their highest
priority and brought to bear, as President Obama said the
United States would do, all elements of their national power to
make sure Iran changed course, I think collectively those
nations could succeed. The problem is that, even though they
are engaged diplomatically, not all of those countries are
using all elements of their national power to persuade the
Iranians to change course.
I mean, it is wonderful that on July 1st a European Union
oil embargo is going to go into effect. But, you know, why is
it, you know, the summer of 2012 before that has happened?
Because in Europe there has been hesitation up until now to
accept the economic costs that come from imposing that oil
embargo. Now, thank goodness they have made the decision to
move forward with that, but it is awfully late in coming.
At the U.N. Security Council, there is certainly more that
could be done against Iran----
Mr. Scott. Let me----
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. But Russia and China have used
their veto----
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Interrupt, if I could, because I am
down to a minute and a half. I apologize.
They border seven countries, the Caspian Sea, and the Gulf
of Oman. They share the Caspian Sea with Russia. I, quite
honestly, think their nuclear threat is much greater to other
countries than it is to the United States. And I have no doubt
that if they get a weapon, they can get it out of that country
and then probably into wherever they want.
But there is a difference in talking and taking action.
Would Russia and China, while they are willing to engage in
talks, support the United States in an action that actually
stopped the construction of a nuclear weapon in Iran?
Mr. Robb. Well, obviously, if Russia and China were to be
in full agreement, this whole discussion would probably be
moot. The problem is that there are ongoing relationships with
both countries that would be put in jeopardy by their taking a
more aggressive stance. And so in the U.N. Security Council,
the resolutions that actually get passed tend to be less
intimidating toward Iran than the ones that--if you had those
two superpowers in sync with the United States in terms of
their understanding of the risks that a nuclear-capable Iran
poses to the region and to the international community, we
wouldn't probably be having this hearing today.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Robb, thank you for you and General Wald's
continued attention to this issue and the work that you did. We
shamelessly used it to introduce legislation to try to augment
this effort to make sure that anyone who is even looking at all
could see that we are serious about a military option, that we
have the resources in place and the training and all of those
other kinds of things.
Mr. Robb. We noticed, and we thank you.
Mr. Conaway. Your written testimony added some additional
specificity to some of that. And we don't need to go through
what it is, but is there something that--you talked about
additional surface-to-air missiles, anti-submarines,
prepositioning the strategic bombers from Diego Garcia.
Is there something that has happened since your original
report that led you to put this additional specificity in your
written comments today, or is it more of the same?
Mr. Robb. Well, you always look to what you have, what
assets you have in place and whether or not they appear to be
sufficient to fulfill whatever mission they are designed to
support.
Mr. Conaway. All right. Well, I do think that your work is
helping continue to put a time-is-of-the-essence kind of cloak
on all of this. Some of the comments on the other side I have
disagreed with this morning, in which they seem to take a
little more innocent view that this thing can be solved.
All of us hold certain truths or certain ideas that we are
willing to die for, willing to absorb just incredible
deprivations in order to stick to those convictions. Is the
idea of a nuclear power, a nuclear weapon of such a national
identity for the Persians in Iran that it is one of those
things that, at the end of the day, they are just simply never
going to give that up no matter what we do to them?
Mr. Robb. Well, I don't believe that the position of the
international community is that it is an absolutely hopeless
cause, if that is what you are----
Mr. Conaway. Well, no, we will continue to sanction and we
will continue in the military option. We will stop them,
ideally, from getting one.
But the idea that they would voluntarily give up this quest
and the impact it has on their international standing, you
know, at any point in time does anybody realistically think
that--I mean, I am pro-life, and I am not giving that up,
period, no matter what you do to me. I am a Christian. Jesus
Christ is my personal savior. I am not giving that up for
anything. That is one of those core beliefs.
Is the core belief that they want a nuclear weapon, is it
such a core belief with them that--and, as Rademaker said
earlier, we can--I mean, the military option only takes it out
for a short period of time--will they ever really give this up?
Or is it just in the leadership, and the people themselves are
not really that keen on it?
Mr. Albright. Yeah, I don't see a united regime on that. I
think we have seen constituencies, I mean, more the technical
side, that appear to really want nuclear weapons. There are
other constituencies that have questions about that. So I don't
think they are united on the value of having nuclear weapons. I
mean, I think they are only united on the desire to have the
capability to do that.
And I think they can--they may make a different decision
down the road. Also, there may be personnel changes at the top
of the whole hierarchy that could lead to a different decision.
There are forces that do--you know, don't just want to be an
isolated pariah state. So I think it is very hard to----
Mr. Conaway. Well, all that is pretty obvious to us, and it
ought to be pretty obvious to them. And most of us operate on
the premise that we operate in our own best interests. These
folks appear to be going counter to operating in their own best
interests, because of the sanctions that have been put in place
and are about to be put in place, all those kinds of things,
and yet, they are really pretty recalcitrant about making----
Mr. Robb. But that is the point of continuing to increase
the sanctions. At some point, it is at least my personal belief
that the powers that be in Tehran will come to the conclusion
that it is in their long-term and short-term best interests to
adopt a different course of action.
I don't think they are going to--you used the word
``voluntarily.'' I don't think anyone suggests they are going
to voluntarily abandon the quest to be a nuclear-capable
nation. They want to be in that club. And that is a pretty
widely held view in the various factions that are identifiable
inside Iran.
But they are ultimately pragmatists, as most--even the
leaders in other countries that appear to be irrational, at
some point there is an element of pragmatism that comes in. And
it is our hope that at some point that will permeate the
thinking and they will arrange--I don't think it will come
through a negotiated settlement. I think that they will take
some action that causes the international community to say, we
have accomplished our goal. We no longer feel as threatened. We
are going to have to be eternally vigilant, but we don't have
to continue to increase the capability and/or the threat of
taking military action.
And if, in fact, they go through with the exercise which
has been offered, that they export all of their HEU, et cetera,
and give intrusive 24/7 inspections, then the international
community, certainly the United States, would be in a position
then, and only then, to begin to roll back some of the
sanctions and allow Iran to come into the world community as a
credible player rather than a pariah state.
Mr. Conaway. Well, again, thanks you for your work on this,
and I hope you are spot-on right. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I thank you very much for your testimony. I
think this discussion has been very helpful.
And I think where Iran is at right now is that, as you
said, Mr. Albright, they would like to be nuclear-weapons-
capable because of the credibility it gives them. They would
also like to not be a pariah state, and I think that is what
makes them different from North Korea. I mean, North Korea was
a pariah state, has been for a while. They didn't care. There
was really nothing we could do to them. They starve 2 million
of their people every year. They did that before they had a
nuclear weapon, and they keep doing it.
The hope with Iran is, given Iran's, you know, centuries of
history and at different times being a relatively prominent
player on at least the regional if not the global stage, they
don't want to be a pariah state. And right now they are trying
to figure out how to have their cake and eat it too. This is
what they are trying to figure out.
And what we have to make plain to them is that the cost is
going--you will be a pariah state if you don't take a step
back. Now, as you have all described very well, that is easier
said than done, but I think that is what our policy goal has to
be.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We have had a wide-ranging discussion. And I am thinking of
one of the points that Mr. Turner was making, that if somebody
tuned in at some point, we would be talking about lots of
different actions that we would take against Iran for various
things depending on how they are moving along on something that
we really don't know. We think we know, we hope we know, but we
can never know totally what they are doing.
What I would like to ask, to kind of bring this back to the
whole purpose of this hearing, is, what do you believe are the
strategic consequences, what would they be for the United
States and for our allies if Iran were to achieve a nuclear
weapon capability?
Mr. Robb. Mr. Chairman, we lay out what we believe are the
strategic consequences in--really, in each of the papers, but
the most recent one, in ``Stopping the Clock,'' we list a
number of activities.
Certainly, you have--the immediate neighborhood is going to
feel compelled to take up its own nuclear programs, and so you
are going to have a proliferation that would take place in the
immediate community. You are going to have a great deal of
interruption in terms of the international energy supply, given
the fact that so much of the world's petroleum passes through
the Strait of Hormuz, et cetera.
You are going to have an instability which will be
exacerbated beyond anything we are experiencing right now in
terms of the economy. Most of Europe is very much on the edge
right now. The United States is attempting to keep from being
drawn into that same type of economic collapse that is
occurring state by state in the European Union right now.
All of these consequences are going to be enormous and are
going to put any chance for a peaceful resolution of the long-
term interest of both the United States and the other major
powers in that region at risk for a very long period of time.
And the cost in individual lives and treasure would be
enormous.
It just--it is one of those situations where the status
quo, if you can't--or if you have to choose between the near-
term costs of depriving Iran of a nuclear capability and the
long-term costs of allowing them to have it, it is not a
difficult choice. I think that is probably--I probably ought to
leave it.
Mr. Rademaker. I can think of no positive consequences of
Iranian achievement of nuclear weapons capability or Iranian
possession of a nuclear weapon.
Senator Robb has pointed to one of the most serious
consequences, which would be the unravelling of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime as other countries felt threatened by
the Iranian nuclear capability and felt they needed to take
steps to protect themselves.
Another very important and very dire consequence that I
will highlight is the fact that Iran is already the world's
most active supporter of international terrorism. And they act
in a very unrestrained way already when it comes to promoting
international terrorism. I personally believe that one of the
attractions to the Iranian regime of having nuclear weapons is
that it would increase their ability to proceed recklessly in
the promotion of terrorism in their region and internationally.
If you take what happened in 2006 in Lebanon as an example,
there was an escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, which is
an Iranian-backed terrorist group, in Lebanon. And it
escalated. Iran--I am sorry, Israel sent forces into southern
Lebanon. Hezbollah started firing increasingly long-range
missiles at Israel. Those missiles were provided by Iran. But
Iran had to be restrained in the degree of support it provided
to Hezbollah because there was always the risk that Israel
might ultimately hold Iran accountable and undertake some
military action against Iran.
I believe one of the reasons Iran would like nuclear
weapons is they believe that if they had such weapons in a
scenario like that, Israel would essentially lose that option.
They would become fearful of using military force against the
sponsor of these terrorist groups. And, as a result, Iran could
be much more unrestrained in the level of support that it gave
to such groups.
And that is just one particular example, but I think
worldwide you would see them feeling that they had a nuclear
shield behind which they could hide and behave in an
increasingly reckless manner in their support for international
terrorism.
Mr. Albright. I also view Iran with nuclear weapons as a
very grave strategic threat to the United States.
I would distinguish between having a nuclear weapons
capability, which I would judge they have now, and we are
living with it. So, I mean, we perceive it as particularly a
threat if they cross the line and have nuclear weapons. What we
have been talking about is if they seek those weapons, then we
are going to try to stop them.
Now, I think to be fair, though, I mean, it is--I think we
need to start to consider, what if all this doesn't work out
well? And I don't want to in any way encourage that as a
policy, but I do think we need to start thinking through this.
What if Iran does get nuclear weapons, you know, 2 or 3 years
from now, and it is in the range of time that we are worried
about, is we wake up and there has just been a nuclear test by
Iran?
And so I think while the policy should remain on preventing
Iran from getting nuclear weapons, I do believe we need to
start thinking through, what if they do? Because you just heard
why that world is going to be so dangerous. But, unfortunately,
if they do, we are still going to have to live in it. And we
need to think through what are the U.S. responses to that
world, while at the same time--again, I want to emphasize--not
changing our current policy to prevent Iran from getting there.
The Chairman. Well, that is an interesting idea. But our
policy is based on what the Senator and Mr. Rademaker say. They
gave some pretty positive reasons why it would be detrimental
to society if they had nuclear weapons. And----
Mr. Albright. I agree with that. And I agree with that.
The Chairman. Fine. Then our policy probably shouldn't
change. Our policy is that they do not--that we do everything
possible to make sure that they do not get that capability. And
that, I think, is the whole purpose of this hearing, is to
strengthen that and to make sure that we have the capability to
make sure that we don't have to change that policy. Because I
think that if we back off from the policy that they do not
attain nuclear capability, then the overall threat to the world
is something we do not want to even contemplate.
We realize that there are other countries around the world
that have nuclear abilities, but none of them have expressed
the bellicose nature of Iran as far as supporting terrorism and
other things. And in that particular neighborhood, it could be
unsettling for the whole world forever.
And I think that this has been a good hearing. I appreciate
you being here. I appreciate the work that you are doing on
this. And I think that we need to move forward sustaining that
policy and do whatever we can to support whoever the President
is in making sure that we have the means necessary to make sure
that that policy stays in place.
Thank you very much.
And that concludes this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge:
Understanding the Military Options
June 20, 2012
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony from experts on the nuclear challenge from Iran. The
expert panel includes former Senator Charles Robb, a task force
co-chair of the National Security Project with the Bipartisan
Policy Center; Mr. Stephen Rademaker, a task force member of
the National Security Project with the Bipartisan Policy
Center; and Mr. David Albright, the President of the Institute
for Science and International Security. Gentlemen, thank you
for joining us today.
The Iranian nuclear program is among the most complex
foreign policy and national security challenges that the United
States faces today. Intensive diplomatic and economic steps
focused on Iran's nuclear program have been undertaken over the
last decade to dissuade Iran from pursuing a military nuclear
program. Unfortunately, it does not appear that these efforts
have succeeded in convincing the Iranian Government to abandon
its military nuclear ambitions.
The United States' stated policy remains that Iran should
not possess a nuclear weapon, as reflected by President Obama's
recent comments in which he stated: ``I think both the Iranian
and the Israeli governments recognize that when the United
States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear
weapon, we mean what we say.'' Moreover, President Obama has
explicitly declared that his administration would use force--a
``military component''--as a last resort to prevent Tehran from
acquiring a bomb. However, this message has not always been
consistent--across administrations--and unfortunately it is not
clear that the Iranian regime is deterred by such statements.
I personally agree that all elements of national power
should be brought to bear to prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon. I certainly recognize that no military
operation is without risk. But given the fact that the
President has stated that military option may have to be
utilized to thwart Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, it is
the committee's responsibility to ensure that the military
option is credible.
Moreover, any consideration of U.S. military response to
Iran's nuclear developments requires rigorous and thoughtful
evaluation, which is why are holding this hearing today. If
diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to stop Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon capability, then a military option
may be the only recourse. Therefore, it is critical to
rigorously study and understand all facets of any military
option, including how it supports our vital national security
interests, its potential for effectiveness, its risks, Iran's
potential responses, the implications for the region. Likewise,
effective military capability in the region could be a useful
deterrent and improve regional stability, negating the need for
a military strike.
Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before the committee
today. I look forward to your testimony and insights into the
nuclear challenge from Iran.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. Regarding your question about the
effect of defense cuts on the credibility of the U.S. military option,
there's no question sequestration presents enormous challenges to U.S.
military forces, and that's one of the reasons it's especially
important right now that we not appear to relax our guard or our
apparent willingness to follow through with a military option in the
event it becomes necessary. The United States has already undermined
its credibility when it comes to preventing a nuclear-capable Iran;
haphazard defense cuts like the sequester will only exacerbate the
perception--in Tehran and among our own allies--that the credibility of
U.S. commitments is declining. In reference to your question about
potential tradeoffs between augmenting U.S. Fifth Fleet and Air Force
capacity on the one hand, and the DOD Strategic Guidance's emphasis on
rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region on the other, the sequester
will affect both by forcing the military to either rely on older
existing weapons systems or make do with fewer of the new capabilities
the Pentagon deems necessary. That being said, Iran's continued
progress toward nuclear weapons capability is the most immediate
national security challenge facing the United States. Potential threats
to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region are less pressing and/or
of lower magnitude; this realignment of U.S. global force posture is a
grand strategic shift that will occur over the medium-to-long-term,
while Iran's rapid recent advances means time is running out. Dealing
with the Iranian threat must take precedence over the serious, but more
gradual, changes required to address threats in the Asia-Pacific
region. This applies both to augmenting U.S. naval and air capabilities
in the Middle East, and to prepositioning supplies in that region
(these supplies could be transferred to Asia-Pacific later).
Moreover, many of the measures we recommend in a BPC task force
paper to augment U.S. Fifth Fleet and Air Force capacity can be
accomplished by reprogramming funds in the FY2011 Omnibus Spending
Bill, instead of drawing funds from the military's priorities for
FY2012 and FY 2013 spending. In fact, some of these measures--such as
strengthening mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities in the region--
are already being undertaken.
Regarding your question about leaks, leaks about capabilities,
plans and other activities that might be under consideration ought to
be avoided at all costs. They don't help the United States in any way,
shape or form. [See page 23.]
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 23.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 27.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Robb. The arbitrary nature of sequestration will hurt the U.S.
military's ability to fulfill its missions, including providing a
credible deterrent to aggression from a range of threats. However, the
United States lacks the key elements of a successful containment
strategy for dealing with Iran if and when it gains nuclear-weapons
capability: credibility; robust, reliable and coordinated allies; and a
deterrable enemy. U.S. credibility is hampered by the lack of certain
response--officials from successive Administrations have failed to
punish Iranian transgressions of previous redlines, including
converting yellowcake into uranium and spinning new centrifuges.
Imagining a nuclear-capable Iran presupposes that Tehran has crossed an
even more significant line in the sand. Furthermore, Washington has
repeatedly downplayed the viability of the U.S. military option. Thus
Tehran has little reason to believe the United States would punish
aggression by Iran if the latter had the cover of a nuclear capability
or weapon.
The United States also lacks reliable allies to help deter a
nuclear-capable Iran. With the exception of Israel, U.S. Middle Eastern
allies are not strong enough to deter aggression with any certainty.
Furthermore, the United States cannot bolster its credibility or
compensate for weak allies by creating tripwires to trigger automatic
responses to Iranian aggression, especially if U.S. forces pivot away
from ground units in the Middle East to naval and air forces in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Finally, the messianic leadership of the Islamic Republic may not
be ideological to the point of national suicide, but historically it
has pursued expansive regional aspirations. These have proven difficult
enough to contain even when Iran lacked a nuclear deterrent and its
regime was not dominated by hardliners. Moreover, the intentions and
motivations of the Iranian regime--especially those individuals in
charge of any nuclear weapons--remain opaque to the United States.
Regarding your question about the sequester's effect on a U.S.
military option, there's no question that you can't cut down
significantly in all of the elements of force that are necessary to
carry out our responsibilities in this area and elsewhere around the
world without severe strain. Because the current and previous
Administrations have used the word ``unacceptable'' to describe a
nuclear Iran, U.S. credibility is now at stake--this implies a red line
requiring the United States to either take military action or lose
credibility. Sequestration could undermine perceptions of U.S. resolve
in addition to cutting forces and spending, and thus damage
credibility. [See page 30.]
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.] [See page 29.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 20, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Do you view Iran's recent announcement that they are
pursuing development of a nuclear submarine as a complicating factor to
international efforts to constrain Iran's highly enriched uranium
production?
Mr. Robb. I would echo Mr. Rademaker's comment that Iran has sought
pretexts to enrich uranium to higher levels for a long time, and I
don't see how developing a nuclear-powered submarine provides such a
justification. Tehran's announcement does point to a larger issue we
cover in our report, which is Iran's long history of acting inimically
to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In addition to its opposition to
the Middle East peace process and support for terrorism and proxy
warfare across the region, Iran is actively pursuing naval and
ballistic missile capabilities to threaten U.S. forces and allies.
Announcing plans to develop a nuclear-powered submarine could perhaps
been seen as a longer-term aspect of this military buildup.
Mr. Langevin. Any potential military action would of course not
occur in a vacuum, but would greatly affect an extremely complex
geopolitical situation in the broader region. How might a strike affect
our work with nations such as Russia and China in other areas--for
example, the conflict in Syria? Can you walk us through the
ramifications of a strike on Iran for our allies in the region--most
specifically, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq?
Mr. Robb. While Syria is a concern, the BPC Iran Initiative (which
I co-chair) has not addressed the potential effects of the military
option on such issues.
In reference to your question about the ramifications of a strike
on Iran for our regional allies, our BPC Iran Initiative has discussed
the potential consequences in our 2010 and 2012 reports on Iran's
nuclear program. While it would be difficult to predict accurately the
specific outcomes of any strike, Iran could retaliate by attempting to
attack Persian Gulf energy installations or fulfill its threat to close
the Strait of Hormuz. These actions would imperil Iraq and our GCC
allies. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might also
attempt to unleash its proxy forces--most worryingly, Lebanese
Hezbollah--against Israel and other U.S. regional allies. There would
be the potential for any such conflict to spill over to Jordan, Turkey
and elsewhere in the region. This could be aggravated by the
instability in Syria, which is Iran's main Arab state ally and Tehran's
primary lifeline to Hezbollah.
In the immediate aftermath of a strike, U.S. policymakers would
have to make crystal clear that the United States will stand by our
regional allies in any conflict with Iran. The Pentagon should augment
its military capabilities in the region--particularly air and naval
forces--to protect the Strait of Hormuz, reassure allies and prevent or
respond to Iranian retaliation. The President would also need to make
clear to the world that Iran's actions have been in longstanding
violation of United Nations resolutions and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Beyond managing a post-strike crisis, Washington would need to work
with these allies to strengthen their defenses against possible Iranian
and/or proxy counterattacks. U.S. policymakers should also be prepared
to release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), work closely
with Saudi Arabia to produce more oil and cooperate with regional
allies to ensure maximum possible oil exports through the Persian Gulf,
Turkey or the Red Sea.
These costs--of a strike and its aftermath--must be weighed against
the costs of living with a nuclear-capable Iran. A nuclear-capable Iran
would threaten U.S. and regional security and set off a proliferation
cascade across the Middle East. Iran and Israel would be locked into an
unstable confrontation resembling a perpetual Cuban Missile Crisis.
Iran would be in a position to transfer nuclear materials to its
terrorist proxies, threaten Israel's existence, embolden radicals,
increase its opposition to the Middle East peace process and
destabilize moderate Arab regimes. It would also seek to dominate the
energy-rich Persian Gulf emirates and OPEC, which would heighten the
risk to secure oil supplies. This would have serious negative
implications for the U.S. economy: every $10 rise in annual oil prices
equates to a nearly 0.5 percent decline in U.S. GDP.
Mr. Langevin. As you know, additional U.S. sanctions are scheduled
to go into place on June 28th, targeted against Iran's central bank,
and an EU oil embargo will begin on July 1st. It is reasonable to
assume that these sanctions will compound the difficulties experienced
by the Iranian regime. How long, in your view, will it take for these
additional sanctions to reach full effect?
Mr. Rademaker. The effects of these sanctions are already being
felt. European Union consumers of Iranian oil--accounting for roughly
one-fifth of Iran's exports in 2011--have already diminished to near-
zero as member countries reduced purchases in advance of the E.U. oil
embargo beginning July 1. Similarly, Iran's major Asian buyers (China,
India, Japan and South Korea, which combined for 70 percent of Iran's
exports in 2011) cut imports from Iran to receive sanctions waivers
from the United States. These customers will likely increase their
purchases over the second half of 2012. Therefore, in terms of their
impact on the main source of Tehran's revenue, the high-water mark for
U.S. and E.U. sanctions may have already occurred, just as the
sanctions officially come into force.
Our Task Force maintains that sanctions against Iran can be a
useful tool in pressuring Iran and demonstrating resolve, as long as
they are enforced completely and have a near-term deadline. Because
they are not fully enforced, and because they are not part of a
comprehensive triple-track strategy, these sanctions may lull
policymakers into the false belief of progress and thus waste more time
as Tehran gets closer its nuclear goal.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Statements by the intelligence community seem to
indicate that there is a consensus of belief that Iran has not yet
decided to make a nuclear bomb. How confident are you in this
assessment and do you believe the intelligence community will
accurately predict if and when Iran does make that decision?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. Assuming it acquires all the necessary
components, it may be difficult to discern whether, or when, Iran
decides to actually assemble a working nuclear bomb. Our Iran
Initiative at BPC maintains that Iran is pursuing--and advancing
toward--a nuclear weapons capability. Iran is most likely to amass the
components of a nuclear device without assembling them or conducting a
test explosion, thus remaining ``a screwdriver's turn'' away from a
weapon, while promoting ambiguity about its true intentions and status.
In this way, Tehran can gain the benefits of a de facto nuclear
deterrent without incurring legal and political repercussions. It is
this eventuality that the United States should be aiming to prevent, as
suggested by bipartisan resolutions in the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives.
The difference in language between ``developing a nuclear weapon''
and achieving ``nuclear weapons capability'' is significant, so the
confusion is potentially dangerous. A country can be considered to have
developed a nuclear weapon once it has assembled the three main
components of a nuclear weapon and successfully tested it. First,
fissile material: either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium,
that can release massive, destructive amounts of energy. Second, the
device, or ``weapon,'' which creates the nuclear explosion by
triggering a nuclear chain reaction in the fissile material. Third, a
delivery mechanism--bomb, missile, or some unconventional means--that
gets the weapon to its target. A nuclear weapons capability is achieved
when a country has all the requisite technology and components, but has
not yet assembled them or tested a weapon. Iran already possesses
delivery mechanisms, both in the form of ballistic missiles capable of
carrying nuclear payloads and an extensive network of terrorist
organizations that could deliver a nuclear weapon by other, less
conventional means. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
which is tasked with monitoring and reporting Iran's enrichment
activities, has expressed serious concerns about Iran's efforts to
develop a nuclear explosive device, including Tehran's denial of access
to a military base where explosives testing for a nuclear device may
have occurred. More important, Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapons
capability is more easily verified than weaponization, and it is its
enrichment program that is the best indicator of Iran's progress toward
nuclear weapons capability. Fissile material production has
historically been the most difficult and time-intensive hurdle to
developing nuclear weapons. Thus, if Iran begins producing highly
enriched uranium, policymakers will have to assume Iran has achieved
nuclear weapons capability. Once Iran acquires fissile material, U.S.
policymakers, military leaders and strategic planners should assume
that Tehran has a nuclear weapons capability, even if it chooses not to
test its device. U.S. intelligence agencies have never before predicted
any country's initial test of a nuclear weapon. The Soviet Union's
nuclear test in 1949, France's test in 1960, China's acquisition of
nuclear bombs in 1964, India's tests in 1974 and 1998, and advanced
Libyan, Syrian and Iraqi programs each surprised the U.S. intelligence
community. U.S. government agencies still lack a robust capability to
detect the development or transfer of nuclear weapons capabilities by
Iran. Accordingly, if Iran sought to assemble a nuclear weapon, we
would likely only detect it after the weapon was tested, by which time
it would be too late. If the administration's intent is to prevent a
nuclear Iran, it should draw a red line that is clear, verifiable and
preventable before it is too late. The red line should be nuclear
weapons capability, not the imperceptible turning of the screwdriver to
assemble a weapon.
Mr. Franks. What is the current state of Iranian launch vehicle
technology and what can we do to eliminate or degrade that technology
to ensure it is not used to deliver a nuclear weapon whether by ICBM,
or MRBM launched from an offshore ship?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. Iran is known to possess the largest
deployed arsenal of short- (SRBM) and medium-range (MRBM) ballistic
missiles in the Middle East. These vehicles are capable of reaching
targets across the Middle East, South Asia and Eastern Europe,
including U.S. and allied military installations. I don't think any of
us have access to current intelligence on what exactly Iran is doing to
develop intermediate- (IRBM) or intercontinental-range (ICBM) ballistic
missiles that could strike Western Europe or the U.S. homeland. We only
know that they've consistently sought missiles with increasingly
greater ranges, as evidenced by their February 2010 test launch of a
satellite rocket. They are likely years, if not a decade or more, away
from developing booster rockets capable of carrying an ICBM to the U.S.
eastern seaboard. Iran is not known to possess any submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) capability; its Russian-made Kilo-class diesel
submarines cannot launch such weapons. Its entire ballistic missile
arsenal must instead be launched from land-based silos and road-mobile
launch systems.
These missiles could be used as delivery vehicles for a nuclear
weapon, if Iran develops a nuclear warhead and sufficient fissile
material for a bomb. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
estimates Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is enough to produce two
nuclear bombs, with further enrichment. The IAEA also stated it
believes Iran has conducted work on an explosive device that could be
utilized in a warhead.
To eliminate or degrade Iran's launch vehicle technology, the
United States and its international partners have passed U.N. Security
Council Resolutions sanctioning Iran's ballistic missile program: 1696
(2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929
(2010). The United States has also deployed, or supported the
deployment of, a range of missile defense capabilities to deter or deny
Iranian ballistic missile launches against potential U.S. and allied
targets. These include: two Aegis-equipped U.S. Navy cruisers in the
Persian Gulf; Patriot interceptor batteries in Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; X-band missile-
defense radars in Israel, Qatar and Turkey; and U.S. funding for
Israel's Arrow missile defense system. Moreover, in May 2012 the House
of Representatives passed H.R. 4133 (The United States-Israel Enhanced
Security Cooperation Act of 2012). In addition to echoing our BPC task
force paper's strong recommendations on the necessity of bolstering
Israel's military option by providing it with aerial refueling tankers
and bunker busting munitions, this legislation called on the United
States to assist Israel in procuring the Iron Dome missile defense
system to intercept rockets and artillery launched by Iranian proxy
forces in Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere.
Ultimately the United States can only eliminate this threat by
demonstrating an ironclad resolve to prevent a nuclear-weapons capable
Iran, ideally through a peaceful, diplomatic resolution. Such a
negotiated solution would include stipulations requiring Iran to make
its weaponization activities much more transparent to the international
community and answer the questions raised by the IAEA about its work on
weapons design. These concerns of the international community have been
captured in the U.N. Security Council Resolutions listed above.
Mr. Franks. How are we responding, and might we better respond, to
China's and India's circumventing economic sanctions by using their own
currencies rather than dollars to buy Iranian oil?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. We applaud the work of Congress and the
Administration to enact tough sanctions against financial institutions
transacting with the Central Bank of Iran, the National Iranian Oil
Company and the Naftiran Intertrade Company. Since coming into effect
at the end of 2011, the threat of such sanctions has forced consumers
of Iranian oil exports to avoid sanctions by reducing purchases, using
non-convertible currencies and bartering to finance those purchases.
This has devalued Iran's currency (rial) and cut into its oil export
revenue. However, despite being tough, these sanctions are weakened by
loopholes allowing for waivers for countries who significantly reduce
their purchases of Iranian oil--even if they don't fully halt imports
from Iran. Tehran is hurting financially, but its nuclear program has
not slowed. This lulls policymakers into the false belief of progress,
thus wasting more time as Tehran gets closer to its nuclear goal.
At this point, additional pressure on the Iranian regime to
negotiate in good faith can come from U.S. efforts to underscore that,
if all else fails, it is prepared and willing to launch an effective
strike against Iran's nuclear program. Boosting the visibility and
credibility of the military option through an effective information and
messaging strategy, economic preparations and military readiness
activities would help persuade buyers of Iran's oil, such as China, to
support U.S. sanctions more fully as a way to peacefully resolve this
crisis or face the possibility of a significant disruption of oil
supply from the Persian Gulf. Strengthening Israel's ability to mount
an effective attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would serve the same
purpose.
Mr. Franks. Do the sanction waivers provided by the Administration
to a number of countries degrade the impact and effectiveness of the
sanctions on Iran? Should those waivers be revoked?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. The waivers provided by the
Administration degrade the impact of sanctions by allowing the main
buyers of Iranian crude--China, India, Japan and South Korea--and
others to continue importing oil from Iran, albeit at reduced levels.
The threat of U.S. and E.U. sanctions caused Iran's oil exports to
contract 15 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2012, but this
decrease would likely be even greater if the Administration did not
provide waivers to countries that must only pledge to decrease imports
from Iran by 20 percent.
While the waivers thus affect the impact of U.S. sanctions, this is
separate from the issue of the actual effectiveness of such measures.
Our Task Force supports tough sanctions as long as the United States
enforces them completely and sets a near-term deadline for them to be
effective. Neither the Obama nor Bush Administrations did this. Even if
they had, the dual approach of diplomacy and sanctions would not be
enough. Creating additional leverage for a peaceful, viable negotiated
solution requires the United States to pursue the triple-track approach
called for in our BPC Task Force reports: diplomacy, robust sanctions
and credible, visible preparations for a military option of last
resort.
Mr. Franks. Will U.S. national security be seriously undermined if
the U.S. accepts a policy of containment of a nuclear Iran?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. As we argue in our BPC Task Force
reports, we believe that a nuclear-weapons capable Iran cannot be
contained. Even if all the necessary elements of a containment strategy
were in place--U.S. credibility; robust, reliable and coordinated
allies; and a deterrable enemy in Tehran--this could not limit the
negative eventualities sparked by an Iranian breakout.
The most worrying consequences of a nuclear weapons-capable Iran
would be: a proliferation cascade across the Middle East, which would
effectively end the international nonproliferation regime; a sustained
spike in global oil prices, which would negatively impact the fragile
U.S. economy; an emboldened and more secure sponsor of terrorism, which
would put Tehran in a position to transfer nuclear materials to its
extremist allies; and an unstable Iran-Israel confrontation resembling
a perpetual Cuban Missile Crisis, which would almost certainly draw in
the United States.
Mr. Franks. How are we responding, and might we better respond, to
China's and India's circumventing economic sanctions by using their own
currencies rather than dollars to buy Iranian oil?
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL
Mr. Kissell. What is the stance towards Iran's Nuclear endeavors
from their regional and bordering nations?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. The United States' Arab and Israeli
allies very clearly perceive a nuclear Iran as an existential threat,
as revealed by the November 2010 WikiLeaks publication of secret U.S.
diplomatic cables. In conversation with U.S. officials, leaders from
Israel and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) compare the Iranian threat
to that posed by Hitler in the 1930s, and warn of a proliferation
cascade in the region if Iran gains nuclear capability. Even without a
nuclear-capable Iran, Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah and senior Egyptian
military and Kuwaiti leaders express fear about growing Iranian
influence in Iran and Lebanon and Tehran's ability to stoke sectarian
violence across the region.
U.S. allies are thus exhorting the United States to increase
pressure on Iran, including through the use of force. Saudi King
Abdullah urged the United States to ``cut off the head of the snake,''
while U.A.E. officials call on the United States to communicate red
lines to Iran and warn that sanctions will be insufficient. For years
Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and
Defense Minister Ehud Barak, have publicly stated they will keep all
options on the table--including preemptive military action--to prevent
or delay Iran's achievement of nuclear weapons capability.
Mr. Kissell. What is the stance towards Iran's Nuclear endeavors
from their regional and bordering nations?
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
Ms. Hanabusa. In your testimony, you say that of the three-prong
approach to Iran, our military option is underdeveloped. What is the
benchmark being used to judge that? Precisely what would be needed to
ensure adequate capability?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. The benchmark is sufficient leverage to
induce Iranian concessions in its negotiations with the P5+1 that would
enable a peaceful and credible negotiated settlement of its nuclear
weapons program. History shows that the best chance for inducing
Iranian concessions is when its leadership faces a dire military
threat. However, since 2010 the United States and its P5+1 negotiating
partners have in effect pursued a dual-track approach of diplomacy and
sanctions toward Iran. This has been insufficient to compel Tehran to
negotiate in good faith, and instead offers the regime an opportunity
to drag out negotiations as a delaying tactic to advance its nuclear
weapons efforts. Throughout this period, Iran continues to ignore U.N.
resolutions, threatens to wipe out our strongest ally in the region,
enriches uranium faster than ever and to ever higher levels, tests more
effective centrifuge models, undertakes operations at a previously
undisclosed underground facility and continues its weaponization
activities.
With the exception of specifying what munitions we ought to sell to
Israel to shore up their capability, our BPC Task Force has not tried
to specify how many specific platforms or weapons the United States
would need. We think that ought to come from the military commanders in
the area, in consultation with the civilian leadership. With that in
mind, our Task Force recently issued a paper laying out a variety of
steps U.S. policymakers should undertake to create additional leverage.
Ms. Hanabusa. When you say that without ramping up our forces in
the region we should supply Israel with the full support needed to
counter an Iranian nuclear threat, what precisely would be needed to
meet the full support you address?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. There are three principal means by
which the United States can usefully strengthen Israel's strike
capabilities against Iranian nuclear facilities: by transferring to it
three KC-135 refueling tankers and 200 GBU-31 advanced bunker busters,
and by upgrading Israel's anti-missile defense systems.
The House of Representatives should be commended for passing H.R.
4133 (The United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of
2012). In addition to echoing our task force paper's strong
recommendations on the necessity of bolstering Israel's military option
by providing it with aerial refueling tankers and bunker busting
munitions, this legislation called on the United States to assist
Israel in procuring the Iron Dome missile defense system to intercept
rockets and artillery launched by Iranian proxy forces in Lebanon, Gaza
and elsewhere.
Ms. Hanabusa. In your response to a question during the hearing,
you said that Iran has not responded to any international requests to
stop their nuclear program besides the time when the U.S. invaded Iraq.
If this is the case, then you seem to be inferring that military
intervention or the imminent threat of military intervention is needed
to stop Iran's nuclear program. Why then in your testimony, do you
believe that diplomacy and sanctions could still have an impact in this
situation?
Mr. Rademaker. The best way to prevent a nuclear Iran is for the
United States to lead and demonstrate its resolve to do whatever is
necessary, including taking military action. This is why our BPC Task
Force endorses the triple-track approach of diplomacy, robust
sanctions, and credible, visible preparations for a military option of
a last resort. At this late date, it is only the threat of force,
combined with sanctions, that affords any realistic hope of an
acceptable diplomatic resolution.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. Given the asymetric tactics we anticipate Iran will
employ in and around the Strait of Hormuz, would you address the
specific threat posed by the C-802 Qader sea-skimming missile and our
ability to defend against it?
Mr. Robb. Iran's acquisition of the C-802 Qader anti-ship cruise
missile is emblematic of a larger shift in the country's naval warfare
doctrine, capabilities and command structure from a surface fleet
controlled by the traditional navy toward an unconventional force
dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This new
approach utilizes asymmetric capabilities and tactics--large numbers of
anti-ship mines, cruise missiles, and swarming high-speed patrol and
light attack craft--to threaten shipping, overwhelm enemy vessels and
deny access to U.S. naval units operating in the Persian Gulf and Gulf
of Aden.
Our BPC Task Force has recommended the United States procure and
deploy force protection munitions and other systems to reinforce
existing U.S. naval capabilities in the Fifth Fleet's area of
responsibility, including surface-to-air missiles, ship gun
modifications and ammunition and electronic and cyber warfare support.
The Task Force has not tried to specify how many specific platforms or
weapons the United States would need. We think that ought to come from
the military commanders in the area, in consultation with the civilian
leadership.
In the larger picture, such measures are an important part of what
must be a broader spectrum of credible military readiness activities.
Boosting the visibility and credibility of the military option
strengthens the chance for sanctions and diplomacy to succeed in
bringing about a peaceful resolution to the standoff over Iran's
nuclear program.
Mrs. Roby. Given the asymmetric tactics we anticipate Iran will
employ in and around the Strait of Hormuz, would you address the
specific threat posed by the Russian Kilo Class and North Korean Midget
Class submarines and our ability to defend against it?
Mr. Robb. Along with anti-ship mines, cruise missiles and swarming
high-speed patrol and light attack craft, Iran's submarine fleet is a
key element of its anti-access/area denial strategy to prevent the U.S.
Navy from projecting power into the Persian Gulf region.
With this threat in mind, our BPC Task Force has recommended the
United States procure and deploy force protection munitions and other
systems to reinforce existing U.S. naval capabilities in the Fifth
Fleet's area of responsibility, including anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities and electronic and cyber warfare support. The Task Force
has not tried to specify how many specific platforms or weapons the
United States would need. We think that ought to come from the military
commanders in the area, in consultation with the civilian leadership.
In the larger picture, such measures are an important part of what
must be a broader spectrum of credible military readiness activities.
Boosting the visibility and credibility of the military option
strengthens the chance for sanctions and diplomacy to succeed in
bringing about a peaceful resolution to the standoff over Iran's
nuclear program.
Mrs. Roby. Is there any credible evidence that Iran could acquire
an S300 Air Defense System and if so potentially from who?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. There does not appear to credible
evidence Iran could acquire such a system at the current time,
especially since the passage of U.N. Security Resolution 1929 (June
2010), which banned the sale of missile systems (among other weapons)
to Iran. However, Iran appears to desire strongly the S-300 for its
advanced surface-to-air missile capabilities which could potentially
deter or deny air strikes on its nuclear program.
Russia produces the S-300 system and has exported it to more than a
dozen, primarily former communist bloc countries and their allies.
Rumors occasionally surface of S-300 sales from these countries to
Iran, most recently from Russia in 2009 and Belarus in 2010. However,
there is no evidence of such transfers occurring, or of Iran possessing
the S-300 or any comparable system.
While the S-300 would strengthen Iran's ability to defend its
nuclear sites against air attack, this should not obscure the fact that
Tehran's nuclear program has actually accelerated in recent years
without such defenses. Moreover, the regime has long acted inimically
to U.S. interests, even as its nuclear program remains vulnerable to an
effective surgical strike by the United States.
Mrs. Roby. How does the Iranian Bavar 373 System compare with the
Russian S300 system?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. Iran has claimed to develop a domestic
replacement for the S-300, which it refers to as Bavar 373. While our
Task Force has not analyzed Iran's air-defense capabilities or defense-
industrial capacity in depth, Tehran's claims to produce such a system
would be in keeping with its well-established intentions to pursue a
nuclear weapons capability.
Mrs. Roby. Is there any credible evidence that Iran could acquire
an S300 Air Defense System and if so potentially from who?
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mrs. Roby. How does the Iranian Bavar 373 System compare with the
Russian S300 system?
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. Sanctions seem to be bringing Iran back to the
negotiating table, and at least somewhat increasing their willingness
to grant the IAEA access to Parchin and other facilities. Would a
strike make Iran more likely to cooperate with the IAEA?
Mr. Robb and Mr. Rademaker. It is the belief of our BPC Task Force
that the dual approach of diplomacy and sanctions simply has not proved
to be enough to compel Iran to negotiate in good faith over its nuclear
weapons program. While our Task Force does not have a position on
whether a military strike would make Iran more likely cooperate with
the IAEA, preventing Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability
requires demonstrating resolve to do whatever it takes to achieve that
goal. At this late date it is only the threat of force, combined with
sanctions and diplomacy, that affords any realistic hope of an
acceptable diplomatic solution to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons
capability.
Ms. Speier. Do you believe threats of military action are helping
negotiations?
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Speier. What impact would a strike likely have on the
international community's ability to access and monitor Iran's
capabilities?
Mr. Albright. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
