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DISARMAMENT MEASURES SHOULD PROMOTE SECURITY FOR ALL…Amb. Munir Akram, New York, 21 October, 1996.

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The end of the Cold War opened up new and exciting opportunities to realize the UN Charter's vision of international peace and collective security based on the just solution of conflicts and disputes, non-use of force and control of armaments at the lowest possible levels. In the past few years, we have witnessed a number of important achievements in the quest for disarmament:

• START II was concluded and nuclear weapons are being actually dismantled and destroyed;
  
• the Chemical Weapons Convention was concluded and may soon come into force;
  
• the NPT was indefinitely extended;
  
• new Protocols severely restricting anti-personnel landmines were adopted by consensus;
  
• Nuclear Weapons Free Zones now cover the whole of the Southern Hemisphere, and
  
• after 40 years, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was adopted. Despite its shortcomings, Pakistan supported the CTBT because it can halt nuclear escalation in our region and prevent the nuclear powers from developing new kinds of nuclear weapons.
  
  

However, our justifiable sense of accomplishment must be tempered by a sober acknowledgment of the limited nature of the progress made and the later dangers that loom over the entire disarmament horizon:

- Over 30,000 nuclear weapons remain in operation readiness. START II may not be ratified by one of its two parties. Even if it is, over 6000 nuclear weapons will be retained by the two, discouraging reduction by other nuclear weapon states and eroding the moral argument for global non-proliferation;

• Contrary to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, plans and proposals have been put foreword for Theater Missile Defenses which could escalate rather than arrest the proliferation of nuclear deployments by those powers which do not possess such anti-missile defenses;
  
• the NPT's indefinite extension was construed by some, as legitimizing their possession of nuclear weapons indefinitely. The Conference's Principles and Objectives identified only two specific objectives - the CTBT and a "cut-off" Treaty, - both of which are perceived, by their sponsors, as non-proliferation rather than nuclear disarmament measures;
  
• some nuclear powers have declared that nuclear weapons are to be retained against uncertain threats emanating from unspecified adversaries, including non-nuclear weapon states;
  
• there is robust refused by some to contemplate multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament;
  
• the Chemical Weapons Convention is likely to come into force without the two declared chemical weapons powers;
  
• CTBT will not prevent the nuclear powers from maintaining their nuclear weapons in operational readiness through non-explosive tests. In any event, the CTBT will not come into force so long as one nuclear-capable State maintains the position that it will not sign the Treaty "not now, not later";
  

Unless the approach to global disarmament changes, what was described by the European Union representative as a "network of disarmament agreements" is likely to become a tangled web of inequity, offering total security to the powerful and advanced states and consigning the small and the weak to total insecurity. The architecture of disarmament which we are constructing in this exciting new era will be flawed and fragile so long as it is based on imposition and inequality. Such a disarmament structure will be challenged, and will eventually collapse.

The world is not composed of the "Knights of right" and the "dark forces of destabilization"; it consists of large and small but sovereign States - each with its own security and development concerns, which should not be trampled upon by misguided crusaders.

Some of the so-called export control regimes are an example of this tendency. For example, the NPT's provisions nowhere sanctioned a suppliers' cartel, whose conditions are applied unequally, at whim, against some and not against others. Similarly, the MTCR arbitrarily determines the conditions for restraints on the transfer of unilaterally determined categories of missiles and components to some States and not to others. It does not address threats arising from indigenously produced missiles, thus discriminatory against the less advanced and weaker states. It is disturbing that such regimes are now sought to be created on a wider scope.

Pakistan is aware of the need for restraint and responsibility in the production and trade of all armaments, conventional and non-conventional. We are prepared to work for internationally negotiated regimes in sensitive areas. But we cannot subscribe to arbitrary regimes and we reject, in particular, the punitive approach espoused by some, often at the cost of their own objectives of promoting global or regional security and non-proliferation.

Fifty years ago, the General Assembly in its first resolution called for eliminating from "national arsenals atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction." This call is even more compelling today. The post Cold War period has created an historic window of opportunity to realize the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers are no longer locked in strategic contest. They do not need nuclear weapons against each other. They certain do not need them against the non-nuclear states. If this opportunity to realize nuclear disarmament is not "seized", it may not return. Great power rivalries may revive. A multi-polar nuclear world could multiply the dangers of a deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

The priority for negotiations on nuclear disarmament was affirmed by the international community at the first Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD I). The milestone Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice has upheld the view that the nuclear powers have an obligation to conduct and conclude such negotiations. This is the view of the overwhelming majority of U.N. Member States, having been proclaimed by the Cartegena Summit of NAM leaders and reiterated by NAM Ministers here in New York last month. The NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Canberra Commission have also confirmed the priority for nuclear disarmament.

Pakistan, together with the members of the Group of 21, has pressed for the creation of an Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, as called for in resolution 50/70 of the last General Assembly session. We have joined 27 other members of the Group in the Conference on Disarmament to propose a draft programme for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, circulated in document CD/1419 of 7 August 1996. We believe that this proposal can serve as the basis for negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament.

We welcome the European Union's commitment to further systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and note the "importance" the European Union attaches to "global nuclear arms reductions". We welcome the readiness of the Russian Federation to open nuclear disarmament talks in the Conference on Disarmament. We specially welcome China's proposal to conclude a Convention banning nuclear weapons.

It should be clarified that the negotiations we are seeking would be designed to elaborate a programme for nuclear disarmament; to identify the measures which constitute parts of the programme, their inter se priorities and the phases and the time-frames within which they would be achieved. Each disarmament measures included in the programme would be negotiated through a mechanism - bilateral, regional , multilateral or global - which is the most appropriate for the specific measure. The nature of the specific disarmament measure will itself indicate the countries whose participation will be relevant in negotiating it. But, we do not agree that nuclear disarmament should be negotiated solely by the nuclear powers. This contravenes the consensus of the SSOD I that: "All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations."

The Conference on Disarmament remains - despite the CTBT episode - the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. It is not a forum for negotiations on non-proliferation agreements only. Nuclear disarmament is a central point on the Conference on Disarmament's long-standing agenda. The Conference on Disarmament cannot be dismissed as "an inappropriate forum for an unamenable subject." The "single hijack" should not create ambitions for a "double hijack".

Pakistan, therefore, hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to establish Ad Hoc Committees to conduct negotiations on all the items on its agenda. The importance we attach to negative security assurances is well known. Until nuclear disarmament is achieved, nuclear weapon states have an obligation to assure non-nuclear states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We are most concerned that doctrines envisaging the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states have not been abandoned by most of the nuclear powers. The logical corollary of the restriction of the security assurances to only the states parties to the NPT, or other non-proliferation arrangements, is that the use or threat of use against non-nuclear states which are not parties to non-proliferation arrangements can be contemplated. Whether explicit or implicit, this threat is contrary to the Charter's proscription of the use or threat of use of force and would give the threatened state the right, under Article 51, to take necessary measures for its self-defense.

Pakistan is prepared to also commence the work of an Ad hoc Committee on the Fissile Materials Convention in the Conference on Disarmament. We had welcomed the adoption of the Shannon Report which reflected the understanding that the scope of the proposed Treaty would be further considered in the Ad hoc Committee. We would like to assure explicitly that our concerns regarding unequal stockpiles will be addressed in negotiating this Treaty. Else, this Treaty too will be another measure for non-proliferation only. It would not contribute at all to nuclear disarmament, as envisaged in paragraph 50(b) of the Final Document of SSOD i.

There are difficult issues involved in the Ad hoc Group on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), specially regarding on-site measures, which are not amenable to solution by a date certain. We agree with the view that compliance with this Convention should also cover the undertakings relating to peaceful cooperation and technological exchanges. We believe that wide adherence to a possible new Protocol can be ensured only if there is genuine consensus on sensitive issues. We have supported the intensification of the work of the Ad hoc Group which should not, however, overlap with or limit the scheduled sessions of the Conference on Disarmament.

In response to the terrible tragedy of landmines affecting over 60 countries, an Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapon was concluded earlier this year after two and a half years of negotiations. Pakistan declared at the time that it does not export landmines. We have scrapped an entire programme for development of Anti-personnel Landmines to confirm with Protocol II. We will complete the detectability requirements well ahead of the stipulated period of 10 years.

The immediate challenge is to ensure the widest possible acceptance of the new rules on the development, use and transfer of landmines. We hope that cooperation for the transfer of technologies to implement these rules will be forthcoming. Another priority is the formidable yet compelling task of clearing the millions of mines which are continuing to kill innocent people. Pressing ahead immediately for a global ban on anti-personnel landmines may respond to popular sentiment but could prove infructious. It could also undermine the immediate aim of securing widest adherence to the new adopted Protocol. The goal of total prohibition will become realistic once alternatives to the use of APLs for self-defense are developed and become available.

While nuclear weapons remain the focus of international concern, we cannot ignore the threats to peace, and breaches of the peace, emanating from conventional weapons. There are four dimensions to the threat posed by conventional weapons today:

• one, the insecurity and instability created in several regions of the world by the larger production and acquisition of armaments by some States which threaten other States, specially smaller neighbouring countries;
  
• two, the growing and unequal concentration of sophisticated and increasingly lethal conventional weapons in the hands of only a few advanced States, thus further exacerbating the inequality between the developed and developing countries;
  
• three, the incentives for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction created by the imbalance in conventional weapons in certain parts of the world;
  
• four, the exacerbation of conflicts and tensions within and among States by the illegal transfer of weapons, including small arms, for terrorists and criminals and the denial of the legitimate means of self-defense to peoples struggling for self-determination and national independence.
  

The international community must address all the above dimensions of conventional weapons in a comprehensive or systematic way. So far, the approach has been partial and piecemeal. Pakistan subscribes to the concept of promoting confidence among States through transparency. We have submitted reports annually for the UN Register. Unfortunately, transparency will not by itself remove the danger posted by unequal levels of conventional arms on certain regions.

Similarly, the bid to control the transfer of armaments, without regard to such regional asymmetries, can actually accentuate imbalance and the threat to peace, instead of ameliorating the situation. We welcome the guidelines on the transfer of conventional weapons adopted by the Disarmament Commission in the context of UN General Assembly resolution 46/36 H. It would be appropriate for the Commission or the Conference on Disarmament to examine the feasibility of evolving guidelines for the production, transfer and deployment of conventional weapons as a means of promoting regional and global stability.

Pakistan believes that, in most instances, the regional approach offers the most effective framework to successfully negotiate agreements for conventional arms control as well as aspects of non-proliferation. The General Assembly has asked the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate "principles" for conventional arms control within the regional and sub-regional framework. This will make a useful contribution to specific negotiations for conventional arms control in various regions of the world. The Conference on Disarmament should commence this process in 1997.

A close examination of the situation in various parts of the world indicates that both conventional arms control and nuclear non-proliferation can be facilitated by addressing and resolving the underlying causes of conflicts and disputes. Arms are acquired by most States for defense against threats that arise almost always from conflicts and disputes in their region. Thus, the political differences between the parties must be addressed together with the disarmament dimensions of regional security.

South Asia has been described as "the most dangerous place in the world". The Cold War in our region is not over; indeed it often heats up to fever pitch. The core cause of tension in South Asia is the Kashmir dispute and the brutal denial of the right of self-determination to the Kashmiri people. We hope that conditions will be soon created for the commencement of a genuine bilateral dialogue between Pakistan and India to resolve the Kashmir dispute, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. Such bilateral talks an be supplemented by measures at the regional and global levels to address the inter-related problems of security, arms control and non-proliferation in South Asia.

In the address to the General Assembly on 3 October 1996, the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed the convening of a multilateral conference on peace and security in South Asia. Such a conference could promote the following three goals:

• one, measures to remove the underlying causes of conflict and tensions between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir;
  
• two, agreements on conventional arms control and confidence-building measures including mutually agreed force ratios and measures to avoid surprise attack; and
  
• three, measures for nuclear restraint, avoidance of nuclear weapons proliferation, and non-development or development of nuclear-capable missiles.
  

After a year during which our neighbour made preparations for a second nuclear test, when it declared that its nuclear option is open, when it reiterated determination to develop and deploy nuclear-capable missiles, when it opposed the CTBT, the international community must surely recognize that a solution to the security problems of South Asia is indispensable for the success of the global endeavours for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Pakistan sees its security as being closely dependent on the success of these endeavours. We shall, therefore, continue to contribute actively and constructively to the work of all forums where the goals of global and regional disarmament are being pursued and promoted.

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